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EMINENT DOMAIN IN TENNESSEE
Chapter One: Scope of the Power of Eminent Domain
Introduction
Eminent domain is the right or power of the
sovereign to take private property for the public
use; to take ownership and possession thereof
upon payment of just compensation to the owner
of the property.1 It is an inherent power of
a sovereign, which is without limitation or
restriction, except for the constitutional limitations
that private property must be taken for a public
use,2 and the owner of such property must be paid
just compensation for the property.3 The legislature
has adopted a definition of “public use” codified
in T.C.A. § 29-17-102 that precludes private use
or benefit or the indirect public benefits resulting
from private economic development and private
commercial enterprise, including increased tax
revenue and employment opportunities. The statute
then provides these exceptions: (1) acquisition
of land for transportation projects, (2) acquisition
of land necessary to the function of a utility,
(3) acquisition of property by a housing authority or
community development agency for redevelopment
in blighted areas, (4) private uses merely incidental
to public use, and (5) acquisition of property for
an industrial park under T.C.A. Title 13, Chapter
16, Part 2. The General Assembly enacted these
restrictions and exceptions in response to the
U.S. Supreme Court case of Kelo v. City of New
London, 126 S. Ct. 326 (2005). Although the power
of eminent domain is an inherent power of the
sovereign, it lies dormant until the legislature
declares the purpose for which it may be exercised
and the agencies that may use the power.4 The
power of eminent domain may be exercised
directly by the legislature by the adoption of
a statute identifying the particular property to be
acquired for a public use, or it may be delegated to
agents who may exercise the power in the manner
prescribed in the enabling statute.5

The power of eminent domain has been delegated
to counties, (T.C.A. §§ 29-17-101; 29-17-801),6 and
municipalities, (T.C.A. §§ 29-17-201; 29-17-801)7.
It has been generally delegated to any person
or corporation authorized by law to construct
railroads, turnpikes, canals, toll bridges, roads,
causeways, or other work of internal improvement.
T.C.A. § 29-16-101.8 The General Assembly has
also delegated the power of eminent domain to
the following:9
Airport authorities
(T.C.A. §§ 42-3-108–42-3-109; 42-3-204)
Beech River Watershed Development Authority
(T.C.A. § 64-1-102)
Bridge companies (T.C.A. § 54-13-208)
Carrol County Watershed Authority
(T.C.A. § 64-1-805)
Coast and geodetic surveys (T.C.A. § 29-17-501)
Counties—Airports (T.C.A. § 42-5-103)
Counties—Electric plants (T.C.A. § 7-52-105)
Counties—Controlled access highways
(T.C.A. § 54-16-104)
Counties—Industrial parks (T.C.A. § 13-16-203)
Counties—Levees (T.C.A. § 69-5-105)
Counties—Public transportation systems
(T.C.A. § 7-56-106)
Counties—Public works projects
(T.C.A. § 9-21-107)
Counties—Railroad systems (T.C.A. § 7-56-207)
Counties—Recreational land (T.C.A. § 11-24-102)
Counties—Roads
(T.C.A. §§ 29-17-801 et seq.; 54-10-205)
Counties—Schools (T.C.A. §§ 49-6-2001 et seq.)
Counties—Solid waste sites (T.C.A. § 68-211-919)
Counties—for the West Tennessee River Basin
Authority (T.C.A. § 64-1-1103(14))
Drainage and levee districts
(T.C.A. §§ 29-17-801 et seq.; 69-6-201 et seq.)
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Electric power districts
(T.C.A. §§ 7-83-303; 7-83-305)
Hospitals (T.C.A. § 29-16-126)
(T.C.A. in certain counties)
Housing authorities (T.C.A. §§ 13-20-104;
13-20-108–13-20-109; 13-20-212;
29-17-401 et seq.)
Light, power, and heat companies
(T.C.A. § 65-22-101)
Metropolitan governments—Energy production
facilities (T.C.A. § 7-54-103)
Metropolitan governments—Port authorities
(T.C.A. § 7-5-108)
Metropolitan hospital authorities
(T.C.A. § 7-57-305)
Mill Creek Flood Control Authority
(T.C.A. § 64-3-104)
Municipalities—Airports (T.C.A. § 42-5-103)
Municipalities—City Manager - Commission
(T.C.A. § 6-19-101)
Municipalities—Controlled access highways
(T.C.A. § 54-16-104)
Municipalities—Drainage ditches
(T.C.A. § 7-35-101)
Municipalities—Electric plants
(T.C.A. § 7-52-105)
Municipalities—Gas systems
(T.C.A. § 7-39-303)
Municipalities—Industrial parks
(T.C.A. § 13-16-203)
Municipalities—Mayor - Aldermanic
(T.C.A. § 6-2-201)
Municipalities—Modified City Manager
(T.C.A. § 6-33-101)
Municipalities—Parks (T.C.A. §§ 7-31-107 et seq.)
Municipalities—Public transportation systems
(T.C.A. § 7-56-106)
Municipalities—Public works projects
(T.C.A. § 9-21-107)
Municipalities—Railroad systems
(T.C.A. § 7-56-207)
Municipalities—Recreational systems
(T.C.A. § 11-24-102)
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Municipalities—Schools
(T.C.A. §§ 49-6-2001 et seq.)			
Municipalities—Sewers (T.C.A. § 7-35-101)
Municipalities—Slum clearance
(T.C.A. §§ 13-21-204; 13-21-206)
(T.C.A. in certain counties)
Municipalities—Solid waste sites
(T.C.A. § 68-211-919)
Municipalities—Streets
(T.C.A. §§ 7-31-107 et seq.)
Municipalities—Utilities (T.C.A. § 7-34-101)
Municipalities—Water systems (T.C.A. § 7-35-101)
Municipalities—For the West Tennessee River
Basin Authority (T.C.A. § 64-1-1103(14))
North Central Tennessee Railroad Authority
(T.C.A. § 64-2-507)
Pipeline companies (T.C.A. § 65-28-101)
Private roads (T.C.A. § 54-14-101 et seq.)
Railroads (T.C.A. §§ 65-6-109; 65-6-123)
Railroads—Branch lines
(T.C.A. § 65-6-126 et seq.)
Railroads—Interurban railroads
(T.C.A. § 65-16-119)
Road improvement districts (T.C.A. § 54-12-152)
Solid waste authorities (T.C.A. § 68-211-908)
State Department of Environment and
Conservation (T.C.A. §§ 11-1-105; 11-3-105;
11-14-110; 59-8-215)
State Department of Transportation
(T.C.A. §§ 29-17-801 et seq.; 54-5-104;
54-5-208; 54-16-104)
State military affairs (T.C.A. §§ 58-1-501 et seq.)
State water and sewer facilities
(T.C.A. § 12-1-109)
Telegraph companies (T.C.A. § 65-21-204)
Telephone companies (T.C.A. § 65-21-204)
Telephone cooperatives (T.C.A. §§ 65-29-104;
65-29-125)
Tri-County Railroad Authority (T.C.A. § 64-2-307)
University of Tennessee (T.C.A. § 29-17-301)
Utility districts (T.C.A. § 7-82-305)
Water companies (T.C.A. §§ 65-27-101 et seq.)
Water and wastewater authorities
(T.C.A. § 68-221-610)
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Such grants of the power of eminent domain are
in derogation of private property rights and will
be strictly construed against the condemners and
liberally in favor of the property owners.10 The
General Assembly in T.C.A. § 29-17-101 expresses
its intent that the power of eminent domain be
used sparingly and that the laws permitting this
exercise of the power be narrowly construed. The
condemner‘s right to take property will be denied
if the condemner has failed to follow the procedures
set forth in the statutes that authorize exercise of
the power of eminent domain.11 Also, the condemner
will be precluded from acquiring a greater interest
in property than is authorized by statute.12
T.C.A. § 68-211-122 prohibits the use by
a municipality of the power of eminent domain
to establish a solid waste landfill outside its
corporate boundaries unless this is approved by
the governing body of the area in which the landfill
is to be located. This approval must be given by
a majority vote at two (2) consecutive regularly
scheduled meetings.

Eminent Domain vs. Police Power
The power of eminent domain, or the power to
acquire private property for a public use, can
generally be distinguished from the police power,
which is the power to adopt regulations to
promote the public health, safety, and welfare of
a community, even though the exercise of either
power may impair the fair market value of private
property.13 Where the impairment of value results
from the exercise of the police power, courts
traditionally find that the loss is not subject to
the just compensation requirements of the United
States and Tennessee Constitutions.14 Thus, claims
for compensation have been denied where the value
of property has been impaired as the result of the
imposition of housing regulations;15 the imposition
of zoning regulations;16 the imposition of utility
rate regulations;17 the change in streets abutting
property from two-way streets to one-way streets;18

or inconvenience, noise, and dirt from construction
of a public improvement that interfered with
the use of property;19 and in an annexation in
which a city annexed the service area of private
trash haulers.20
This theoretical distinction becomes blurred when
the police power regulation impairs the value or
use of private property to such an extent that no
beneficial use of the property remains.21 These
instances have become more common as local
governments have imposed land use regulations
upon private property instead of using limited
public funds to acquire private property for public
use. This problem was first addressed in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon,22 where Justice Holmes held
that “while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far, it will be
recognized as a taking...(as)...a strong public desire
to improve the public condition is not enough to
warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than
the constitutional way of paying for the change.”
This holding has been applied in Tennessee to
a zoning regulation that deprived the owner of
the beneficial use of the property.23 Where such
a “regulatory taking” occurs, the property owner
is entitled to recover “just compensation” for the
taking, not just the invalidation of the regulation
that resulted in the taking.24 These issues will be
discussed in further detail in chapter five.

Eminent Domain vs. Accidental
or Negligent Acts
A governmental defendant must perform
a purposeful or intentional act for a taking
to exist, and a taking will not result from
unavoidable incidents or negligent acts.25
See T.C.A. § 29-16-127.

Eminent Domain for Industrial Parks
A municipality may exercise the power of eminent
domain to develop an industrial park only with
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respect to property located within its boundaries
or in an urban growth boundary. A municipality or
county, or both, operating a joint park may exercise
the power of eminent domain for development of
the park within the boundaries of the county
and within an urban growth boundary and
a planned growth area. A municipality must obtain
a certificate of public purpose and necessity from
the Department of Economic and Community
Development for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain even if no funds will be borrowed.
The certificate must be based upon a finding that
the municipality was unable to acquire the property
through good faith negotiations or to acquire any
alternative property of comparable suitability.
Good faith negotiations are established if the
municipality made an offer to purchase the property
for an amount equal to or greater than the fair
market value determined by the average of at least
two appraisals by independent qualified appraisers.
T.C.A. § 13-16-207(f).

4

EMINENT DOMAIN IN TENNESSEE • Municipal Technical Advisory Service

Chapter Two: Condemnation Procedures
Introduction
There are a variety of condemnation procedures
that have been established for municipalities
and counties,1 but those used most commonly
are the traditional “jury of view” procedure,
T.C.A. §§ 29-16-101 et seq., and the supplementary
procedure. T.C.A. §§ 29-17-901 et seq. These
statutory provisions normally permit the condemner
to select the procedure of its choice from the
available options.2 This manual will discuss only
the traditional “jury of view” procedure and the
supplementary procedure, since the same principles
generally are applicable to the other procedural
schemes available to counties and municipalities.

eminent domain proceedings.5 Once condemnation
proceedings have been filed in the circuit court, the
court may resolve matters that are incidental to the
condemnation case, such as contract6 or boundary7
disputes involving the condemned property. The
only exception to this rule involves cases that
were properly brought in chancery court to obtain
injunctions or other equitable relief.8 The chancery
court has been found to have jurisdiction to
award appropriate relief under the eminent domain
statutes in cases that were initially brought to
obtain injunctive relief,9 to void a contract,10 or to
reform a deed.11

T.C.A. § 6-54-122 establishes special procedures
to be followed by a municipality in taking
unincorporated property in any county in
which the municipality was not located before
May 1, 1995. The municipality must notify the
county in writing, and the county must approve
the taking. The county’s disapproval may not be
arbitrary or capricious and may be reviewed by
statutory writ of certiorari. These provisions do not
apply to takings necessary to provide utility service,
certain takings by metropolitan governments, or
takings relative to airports or projects sponsored
jointly by a municipality and a county.

Jury of View Procedure

The condemner seeking to acquire an interest
under the power of eminent domain must first file
a lawsuit to accomplish this objective. In the
lawsuit, the court will be presented with two issues:
(1) whether the condemner has the right to take the
property,3 and (2) the amount of just compensation
to which the property owner is entitled.4
Under the “jury of view” and the supplementary
procedures, the condemnation action must be
filed in the circuit court in which the property
is located. T.C.A. §§ 29-16-104; 29-17-902. Thus,
the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over

The jury of view procedure requires the condemner
to initiate the condemnation action by filing
a petition for condemnation in the circuit court
and giving the property owner 30 days notice
of the proceedings. T.C.A. §§ 29-16-104 thru 105
and 29-17-104. The circuit court then appoints
a jury of view to examine the property to be
condemned and determine the amount of just
compensation to which the property owner is
entitled. T.C.A. §§ 29-16-107 thru 113. The jury
of view will then file its report with the court.
The report may be confirmed or it may be
excepted to and/or appealed by one or both
parties that have objections to the report.
T.C.A. § 29-16-115 thru 118.
If the report is confirmed, an order will be
entered conveying the property to the condemner
upon payment to the property owner of the
amount of just compensation set by the jury of
view. T.C.A. § 29-16-116. If an exception is filed,
the court may, upon a showing of good cause,
appoint a new jury of view. T.C.A. § 29-16-117.
If an appeal is filed to the report, the circuit
court conducts a trial de novo before a petit jury.
T.C.A. § 29-16-118.
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Petition for Condemnation
The petition for condemnation must be filed in
the county in which the property is located.
T.C.A. § 29-16-104. The petition must name
as defendants all parties having any interest
in any way in the property being acquired.
T.C.A. § 29-16-106. All parties must be named as
defendants for the condemnation proceedings to
bind the parties, with the exception of unborn
remaindermen, who are bound if all living parties
in interest are parties. T.C.A. § 29-16-106.12
Thus, to obtain clear title to the property, the
condemner should name as defendants the spouse
of the property owner,13 any person owning a life
estate or reversionary or remainder interest in the
property,14 any lessee of the property,15 any holder
of a recorded mortgage,16 and any holder of any
other interest in the property, including a purchase
contract of which the condemner is aware.17 The
name and residence addresses of all defendants, if
known, should be listed in the petition, and if the
name or address is unknown, that fact should be
stated in the petition. T.C.A. § 29-16-104.
The body of the petition for condemnation should
set forth the statute, private act, or charter
provision giving the condemner the general power
to acquire property by eminent domain and should
cite the jury of view statutes as the specific
statutory procedure being used by the condemner
to acquire the property in question.18 The petition
should also identify the specific ordinance or
resolution of the county or municipal legislative
body authorizing the acquisition of the property
under the power of eminent domain.
The nature of the project for which the property
is being acquired should be described.
T.C.A. § 29-16-104. The petition should recite that
the project is for a public use, is in the public
interest, and that the acquisition of the property is
necessary to complete the project.19 The particular
interest in the property, either a fee interest or an

6

easement, should be identified. T.C.A. § 29-16-104.
An accurate legal description of the property
should be included, along with a corresponding
map or plat attached as an exhibit if available.
T.C.A. § 29-16-104.20 Also, any known encumbrances
upon the property should be specified. Finally, the
petition should contain a prayer that a copy of the
petition be served on the defendants and a suitable
portion of the land or the rights of the defendants
be awarded to the condemner. T.C.A. § 29-16-104.

Deposit and Appraisal
The condemner using the jury of view procedure
must deposit with the clerk of the court at the
time the petition is filed the amount determined
by its appraisal as the amount the property owner
is entitled to for the property being acquired.
T.C.A. § 29-17-701. The appraisal must value the
property considering its highest and best use, its
use at the time of the taking, and any other uses
to which the property is legally adaptable at the
time of the taking. The appraiser must be a Member
of the Appraisal Institute (MAI) or an otherwise
licensed and qualified appraiser. T.C.A. § 29-17-1004.
The statute requires interest to be paid only on
the amount of an award exceeding the deposit.
T.C.A. § 29-17-701. Thus, the statute provides the
condemner with a mechanism to avoid the payment
of interest on the amount deposited.21
The condemner should make a good faith estimate
of the damages and expenses the property owner
will likely incur when it determines the amount
to deposit.22 The amount of the deposit should be
specified in the condemnation petition. The amount
of the deposit is not relevant to the trial,23 and the
condemner can offer proof that the property is of
lesser value.24

Notice
Notice of the filing of the condemnation petition
must be given to each respondent at least 30 days
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before the taking of any additional steps.
T.C.A. § 29-17-104. If the defendant’s name or
address is unknown, or if he or she is not a resident
of the state, notice should be given as for suits
in chancery court. T.C.A. § 29-17-104.25 Although
notice by publication is also authorized for nonresidents of the state, the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution requires more than notice by
publication when the name and address of
a non-resident defendant are known or very easily
ascertainable.26 The notice should advise the
defendant of the filing of the petition and the date
scheduled for presenting the petition to the court
for issuance of the writ of inquiry.27
The notice of the filing of the petition is in lieu
of the summons that is normally issued in civil
actions.28 The manner of service of the notice is not
specified in the applicable statutes; however, Rule
71 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that those rules will be applicable to the extent
they are not in conflict with or do not contradict or
contravene the provisions of the applicable statutes.
Therefore, service of the notice, accompanied by
a copy of the petition for condemnation, can be
accomplished in any manner authorized by Rule 4
of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. A return
of the notice, like a return of a summons, should
be completed in compliance with Rule 4.03 of the
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the right to take has not been challenged within
30 days after the giving of notice, the condemner
may take possession of the property. If the right
to take is challenged, the court must promptly
determine as a matter of law whether there is
a right to take. If the court determines there is
a right to take, it must issue a writ of possessions
if necessary. T.C.A. § 29-17-104.

Writ of Inquiry
At the time the petition is presented to the court
for the issuance of the writ of inquiry, which
cannot occur until 30 days after the defendant has
been given notice of the filing of the petition, the
condemner should submit a motion to sustain the
condemner’s right to take the property under the
power of eminent domain. This motion asks the
court to issue the writ of inquiry and fix a time
and place for the inquest. Any challenge to the
condemner’s right to take must be asserted at this
stage of the proceedings.29
If no challenge to the condemner’s right to take
is made, the court will sustain the condemnation
proceedings and order the issuance of the writ of
inquiry of damages. T.C.A. § 29-16-107. This order
should recite that:
• The petition for condemnation has been
properly filed and notice given to the
defendants;
• The condemner has the right to acquire the
property as disclosed in the order;
• The clerk should issue a writ of inquiry to
appear on a fixed date and place and that no
further notice will be given;
• Upon selection of the jury of view the jury
will proceed to the property, examine it, and
hear testimony of witnesses, but no argument
of counsel, and will set apart by metes and
bounds the property to be condemned and
assess the damages as required by law; and
• That the jury of view will reduce its report to
writing and deliver it to the sheriff, who will
return it to the court.30
If the defendant challenges the condemner’s right
to take, the court must first resolve this challenge
before it may order issuance of the writ of inquiry.
T.C.A. § 29-16-107.31 If the court finds that the
condemner has the right to take the property, it
will sustain the condemnation proceedings and
order issuance of the writ of inquiry of damages.
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T.C.A. § 29-16-107. The order directing the issuance
of the writ of inquiry is not a final order and,
therefore, is not appealable.32
The writ of inquiry is issued by the clerk and
directed to the sheriff, commanding him to summon
a panel of jurors to appear on a fixed date and
place. T.C.A. § 29-16-107.33 The sheriff thereafter
summons a panel from 12 to 15 potential jurors
from which the jury of view will be selected. The
sheriff should return the writ to the clerk of court,
specifying the names of the persons on whom the
writ of inquiry was served.34

Selection of the Jury of View
The jury of view will consist of five persons,
unless the parties agree to a different number.
T.C.A. § 29-16-108. The jurors must possess the
same qualifications as jurors in other civil cases,
with the additional qualification that no members
of the jury of view may have an interest in
a similar case. T.C.A. § 29-16-109. The jurors may be
challenged for cause or peremptorily as in any other
civil case. T.C.A. § 29-16-108. In the instance where
the name of the juror is selected by the court and
the juror is unable to attend, the sheriff will select
a replacement. T.C.A. § 29-16-110.

View and Report
If the date has not been set by the court, the
sheriff must give the parties three days’ notice
of the time and place of the inquiry.
T.C.A. § 29-16-111.35 On the date and time specified,
the jury will be selected (if the names of the jurors
are not specified by the court or the parties) and
sworn to fairly and impartially, without favor or
affectation, and will lay off by metes and bounds
the property required for the proposed improvement
to assess the damages to the landowner.
T.C.A. § 29-16-112.
The jury may then receive brief instructions from
the court on its duties, which are to go onto the

8

property, to examine it, to hear testimony of
witnesses but no arguments of counsel, to assess
the damages, and to prepare a report in writing
and deliver it to the sheriff.36 The jury of view will
then be placed in the charge of the sheriff and will
proceed to examine the property. T.C.A. § 29-16-113.
The parties and their counsel may accompany
the jury of view to the property and put on
evidence as to its value, but counsel are not
permitted to make arguments to the jury of view.
T.C.A. § 29-16-113.37 After the investigation of the
property and the testimony have been completed,
the jury of view must identify by metes and bounds
the property required for the proposed project and
must assess damages to the landowner according to
the principles discussed in chapter four.
T.C.A. § 29-16-113. The decision of the jury of
view may be a majority instead of a unanimous
decision. T.C.A. § 29-16-115.38 The decision
should be reduced to writing, and the report
must include a legal description of the property
and the amount of the award and be signed by
a majority of the jurors.39
The report should be delivered to the sheriff
who returns the report to the court.
T.C.A. § 29-16-115. If the parties do not object
to the report, it is confirmed by the court upon
motion by the condemner.40 The court then enters
an order confirming the report. T.C.A. § 29-16-116.
This order should incorporate the report of the
jury of view, should order that the property be
divested from defendants and vested in the
condemner, and further order that the condemner
pay the defendants the amount specified in the
report.41 The order should also specifically provide
for the issuance of a writ of possession to put the
condemner in possession, if necessary.42
If there is no dispute as to the proper distribution
of the funds to defendants, the order should
specify this distribution; otherwise, the court
must retain jurisdiction to permit the defendants
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to present proof on their respective interests and
the proper disposition of the award.43 This order
should also adjudge the costs of the case (normally
against condemner) and provide for payment of the
members of the jury of view.44 The maximum amount
of this payment is specified at T.C.A. § 29-16-125.

Exceptions and Appeal
Either party may file exceptions to the report
of the jury of view, and for good cause shown,
the court may set aside the report of the jury of
view and issue a new writ of inquiry for a new
jury of view. T.C.A. § 29-16-117. Exceptions to
the report of the jury of view should be directed
toward some irregularity in the proceedings,
misconduct of the jury of view, or where the report
is founded on erroneous principles.45 The court
considers the exceptions based on the proof in
the record; therefore, an exception on the grounds
of inadequacy of the damages would normally be
insufficient.46 Although no time period is specified
for filing exceptions, the appeal from the report
of the jury of view must follow the disposition of
the exceptions,47 and such an appeal must be filed
within 45 days of the confirmation of the report of
the jury of view. T.C.A. § 29-16-118. It is therefore
conceivable that a court would find that exceptions
must be filed and disposed of prior to the expiration
of the 45-day period.
An appeal is the proper remedy if a party objects
to the amount of damages awarded by the jury of
view.48 The remedies of exception and appeal are
cumulative and successive.49 A party may file an
appeal regardless of whether exceptions have
been filed.50 Either party may file an appeal within
45 days of the entry of the order confirming the
report of the jury of view, and upon giving security
for costs obtain a trial de novo before a jury as in
any civil case. T.C.A. § 29-16-118.
The condemner who obtained possession under the
order confirming the report of the jury of view51
may continue in possession upon filing of an appeal

by posting a bond, payable to defendants, in double
the amount of the award of the jury of view,
conditioned upon the condemner’s compliance with
the final judgment in the case. T.C.A. §§ 29-16-120;
29-16-122.52 Costs on appeal must be paid by
the appealing party in all cases where the petit
jury affirms the award of the jury of view or is
more unfavorable to the appealing party.
T.C.A. § 29-17-119. In all other cases the court
may award costs as in other chancery cases.
T.C.A. § 29-16-119.

Nonsuit
The condemner may take a voluntary nonsuit under
Rule 41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure
in a condemnation case.53 A nonsuit cannot be
taken after the condemner has taken possession
of the property following confirmation of the
report of the jury of view, leaving nothing to be
determined except the amount of compensation
due the defendant.54

Supplementary Procedure
The supplementary condemnation procedure set
out in T.C.A. §§ 29-17-901 et seq., can be used
by the state of Tennessee to acquire such rightof-way, land, material, easements, and rights
as are necessary, suitable, or desirable for the
construction, reconstruction, maintenance,
repair, drainage, or protection of any street,
road, freeway, or parkway. In addition to these
purposes, municipalities and counties can use
the supplementary procedure for any municipal or
county purpose for which condemnation is otherwise
authorized by any act of the Tennessee General
Assembly, unless expressly stated to the contrary.
T.C.A. § 29-17-901. Levee and drainage districts in
certain counties also may use the supplementary
procedure. T.C.A. § 29-17-901. The supplementary
procedure may not be used by housing authorities
since they are not counties or municipalities.55
The supplementary procedure is a cumulative
procedure for the exercise of eminent domain and
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should be construed in pari materia with the other
eminent domain statutes.56 This supplementary
procedure was designed to protect the property
owner by having the amount the condemner believes
the property owner is entitled to deposited in
court, and when that money has been deposited,
to give the condemner the almost immediate right
of possession.57 This purpose, however, has been
largely negated by statutory amendments requiring
30 days notice of filing the condemnation petitions
in all eminent domain cases.
The supplementary procedure, like the jury of
view procedure, requires the condemner to initiate
the condemnation action by filing a petition for
condemnation in the circuit court, accompanied
by a deposit for the amount of damages the
condemner believes the property owner is entitled
to, and giving the property owner notice of the
proceedings. T.C.A. §§ 29-17-902; 29-17-903. If
the condemner is a municipality or county, any
defendant may elect to use the jury of view
procedure by filing a statement to that effect
within five days of service upon the defendant.
T.C.A. § 29-17-901.58
If the condemner’s right to take is not questioned,59
the condemner may take possession of the
property 30 days after the notice has been given.
T.C.A. § 29-17-903.60 If the property owner is
satisfied with the amount of the deposit, he or she
may withdraw that amount from the court by filing
a sworn statement stating that he or she is
the owner of the property or property interests
described in the petition for condemnation
and that he or she accepts the deposit in full
settlement for the taking of the property and all
damages occasioned to the remainder thereof.
T.C.A. § 29-17-904. The court will then enter an
order divesting the property owner of title and
vesting it in the condemner. T.C.A. § 29-17-904.
If the property owner is dissatisfied with the
deposit, he or she may file an exception to the
amount deposited by the condemner, and a trial
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before a petit jury may be held on the amount of
just compensation due the property owner.
T.C.A. § 29-17-905.

Petition for Condemnation
Although the interests of the defendants need
not be specified, the condemner may specify the
interests of different defendants.61
If any person who is a proper party defendant is
omitted from the petition for condemnation, the
condemner may file amendments to add them.
T.C.A. § 29-17-909.

Notice
As with the jury of view procedure, notice of the
filing of the condemnation proceeding must be
given to all defendants. T.C.A. § 29-17-903. This
notice must be given at least 30 days before any
additional steps are taken in the case by the
condemner. T.C.A. § 29-17-903. The constitutional
limitations on service by publication that were
discussed under the jury of view procedure apply
to the supplementary procedure. Service of the
notice, accompanied by a copy of the petition for
condemnation, can be accomplished in any manner
authorized by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

Deposit and Appraisal
The condemner must determine what it deems
to be the amount due the property owner and
deposit that amount when it files the petition for
condemnation.62 This deposit should be a good faith
estimate of damages and expenses the defendant
will likely incur as the result of the condemnation.63
Evidence of the amount deposited is irrelevant,
however, if the condemnation goes to trial on the
amount of damages.63A
The amount deposited must be based upon an
appraisal. The appraisal must value the property
considering its highest and best use, its use at
the time of the taking, and any other use to which
the property is legally adaptable at the time of
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the taking. The appraiser must be an MAI or an
otherwise licensed and qualified appraiser.
T.C.A. § 29-17-1004.

Default
If the property owner does not appear and accept
the amount of the deposit or take exception to the
amount of the deposit, the court can enter a default
judgment against the property owner. The court
will then hold a hearing upon the record and, in
the absence of the property owner, determine the
amount of just compensation to which the property
owner is entitled. T.C.A. § 29-17-907.

Acceptance
If the defendant is satisfied with the amount of
the damages, he or she may file a sworn statement
verifying that he or she is the owner of the property
or property rights being condemned and that he or
she accepts the deposit as a full settlement for the
taking of the property and any incidental damages
to the remainder of the property of the defendant.
T.C.A. § 29-17-904. The court will thereafter enter
a final judgment divesting the property owner
of title and vesting title in the condemner.
T.C.A. § 29-17-904. If the condemner identifies
the amount of the deposit that should be allocated
to the various defendants, a defendant may
accept that amount in full settlement of his or
her interest.64

Exception and Trial
If the property owner is dissatisfied with the
amount deposited, he or she may file an exception
or answer on or before 30 days from the date of
notice of filing the petition. T.C.A. §§ 29-17-905 and
29-17-105. The answer must be filed within 30 days
of service of the notice. T.C.A. § 29-17-105.
If the property owner files an exception or answer
to the amount deposited by the condemner, a trial
may be held before the petit jury as in other civil
cases. T.C.A. §§ 29-17-905 and 29-17-105. To obtain
such a jury trial, the property owner should make

a demand for a jury under Rule 38.02 of the
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, or file a motion
for a jury trial under Rule 39.02 of the Tennessee
Rules of Civil Procedure.65 The trial will be limited to
determining the amount of compensation to be paid
to the defendant for the property or property rights
taken. When adverse claims by multiple defendants
are made for compensation, the court and jury must
also resolve those claims. T.C.A. § 29-17-908.
The defendant who has filed an exception is entitled
to withdraw, prior to trial, the amount deposited by
the condemner without prejudice to the rights of
either party. T.C.A. § 29-17-906.66 To withdraw the
deposit, the defendant must make a written request
to the clerk in which he or she agrees to refund the
difference between the amount of the deposit and
the final award if the final award is less than the
amount of the deposit. T.C.A. § 29-17-906.
If the final award is less than or equal to the
amount of the deposit, the defendant must pay the
costs of the trial. T.C.A. § 29-17-912. Rule 54.04 of
the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure governs the
taxing of any additional costs. In other cases, the
condemner is responsible for paying the costs.
T.C.A. § 29-17-912.

Nonsuit
As with the jury of view procedure, the condemner
may take a voluntary nonsuit prior to obtaining
possession of the defendant’s property.67 However, if
the condemner abandons the proceedings, the court
may order the condemner to pay defendants for all
reasonable costs, including reasonable attorney,
appraisal, and engineering fees actually incurred
because of the condemnation proceedings.
T.C.A. §§ 29-17-912 and 29-17-106. An abandonment
occurs when the condemner voluntarily gives
up the intended condemnation or declines
to carry the condemnation proceedings through
to a conclusion.68
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Chapter Three: The Right to Take
Introduction
Condemnation cases are of a dual nature, the first
part involving the determination of the condemner’s
right to take the property, and the second part
involving the amount of damages to which the
property owner is entitled, provided the right to
take exists.1
Each condemner must satisfy a three-part test in
order to have the right to take private property
under the power of eminent domain. The first part
of the test is the authority of the condemner to
use the power of eminent domain. The second part
of the test is whether the private property being
taken will be put to a public use by the condemner.
The third part is whether the private property is
necessary for the accomplishment of the public use.

Authority
As noted in chapter one, the Tennessee General
Assembly has by statute or private act authorized
the exercise of the power of eminent domain by
a wide variety of governmental agencies and public
service corporations. However, for the condemner to
have the right to take a specific piece of property,
the entity with the power of eminent domain must
determine that the particular property being taken
will be put to a public use and that the particular
property is necessary for that use. Such action by
the entity is essential not only to show that the
condemnation proceedings are properly authorized,
but, as discussed further below, to eliminate any
challenge by the property owner regarding the
necessity for the taking of the property.
The municipal or county condemner normally
authorizes the acquisition of property under the
power of eminent domain through adoption of
an ordinance or resolution that authorizes the
acquisition of certain parcels of property for
a specified municipal or county project.2 If an
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ordinance is required, a resolution will not suffice.2A
Such an ordinance or resolution should set out
the nature of the project being undertaken, recite
that the taking is for public use and in the public
interest, and state that acquisition of the particular
properties identified is necessary for that purpose.3
The ordinance or resolution should specifically
authorize the filing of condemnation proceedings to
acquire the properties identified.4
There must be strict compliance with all applicable
charter provisions, statutes, and private acts
regarding the adoption of ordinances or resolutions.
Failure to comply will result in the condemner
lacking the authority to condemn the property
identified in the ordinance or resolution.5 Also,
if the applicable statutory provisions impose
pre-conditions to the filing of condemnation
proceedings, such as publication of notices,
the pre-conditions must be met for the
condemner to have the authority to institute
condemnation proceedings.6
A copy of the ordinance or resolution may be
attached to the petition for condemnation7 or
referenced by ordinance number in the body of
the petition. If the right to take is challenged,
a certified copy of the ordinance or resolution
may be introduced into evidence to establish
that the condemner has the authority to take
the property in question.

Public Use
The term “public use” does not have a precise and
universally acceptable definition.8 The determination
of whether a proposed use constitutes a public use
must be based on the facts of each case because
the term must remain elastic to meet the growing
needs of a complex society.9
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The General Assembly adopted a restrictive
definition of “public use” that is codified in
T.C.A. § 29-17-102(b). Generally, the definition
precludes the use of eminent domain for private
benefit and makes exceptions for certain wellrecognized public uses that normally have
incidental private benefits.
As noted above, the legislative body makes the
initial determination that the taking of private
property is for a public use. If the property owner
challenges the condemner’s right to take on the
grounds that the property will not be put to
a public use, the court has the right and the duty
to determine whether the proposed use is a public
use.10 The determination by the legislative body
that the proposed use is a public use is entitled to
a strong presumption of correctness,11 but it is not
conclusive on the court.12 When the court finds that
the proposed use has no significant relationship to
the public benefit, it must find that the condemner
lacks the right to take private property under the
power of eminent domain.13

Narrow vs. Broad View
Various decisions by the courts on whether
a proposed use is a public use have been
categorized into two groups: (1) cases in which
the courts used a narrow view of the scope of public
uses, and (2) cases in which courts used a broad
view of the scope of public uses.14 Courts using the
narrow view require that the public must be entitled
as of right to directly use or enjoy the property
taken.15 Under the broad view, the condemnation
of the property need be only for the public benefit
or common good.16 Under either view, it is not
essential that the entire community directly enjoy
or participate in the proposed use for the court to
find a public use.17 Thus, the extension of utility
service to serve a single customer who has the right
to service from the utility may constitute a public
use that justifies the condemnation of easements
necessary to construct the utility line.18

Under the federal Constitution’s public use
requirement, a public entity may take private
property for transfer to another private party for
economic development.18A Since Tennessee does
not have statutes authorizing this except for blight
removal and industrial development, however,
it is unlikely that the state constitution’s public
use clause would be interpreted to embrace Kelo
takings. Further, the General Assembly passed
legislation in response to the Kelo case, generally
codified in T.C.A. §§ 29-17-101 et seq., that
attempts to ensure that there will be no Kelo
takings in Tennessee.

Public vs. Private Condemner
In determining whether a proposed use constitutes
a public use, the courts also consider whether the
condemner is a public or private entity. For the
purpose of this analysis courts have recognized that
there are at least three categories of condemners:
governmental entities, public service corporations
regulated by the state, and private individuals or
corporations, and that the standards for public use
will differ for each category.19
If the condemner is a governmental entity, the
courts determine whether the public would be
entitled to receive and enjoy the benefits of the
proposed use.20 The general public need not have
access to the property to satisfy this requirement.21
Acquiring property as part of a redevelopment plan
under which the property will subsequently be
resold to a private developer does not result in the
property being acquired for a private purpose when
the public receives a benefit from the complete
implementation of the redevelopment plan.22
Where the condemner is a public service corporation
regulated by the state, the court must determine
whether the public will be given an opportunity
to make use of the service provided by the public
service corporation at reasonable rates and
without discrimination.23 The proposed use must

EMINENT DOMAIN IN TENNESSEE • Municipal Technical Advisory Service

13

satisfy a public demand for facilities for travel or
transportation of intelligence or commodities, and
the general public, under reasonable regulations,
must have a definite and fixed use of the services
of the condemner independent of the will of
the condemner.24
If the condemner is a private corporation or
individual, the courts will rarely find that the
proposed use is a public use. If the proposed use is
absolutely necessary to permit the private individual
or corporation to discharge duties owed to the
public, a public use may be found.25 Otherwise the
court will require the condemner to establish that
the general public will be entitled to make a fixed
and definite use of the property being condemned,
independent of the will of the condemner.26
The following have been found to constitute
public uses when the condemner was
a governmental entity:
• Municipal streets;27
• Street lights;28
• County roads;29
• Bridges;30
• Sewers;31
• Utility facilities and office buildings;32
• Waterworks;33
• Cemeteries;34
• Golf courses;35
• Parks;36
• Greenbelts;37
• Slum clearance projects;38
• Redevelopment projects;39
• Easements across railroad rights of
way;40 and
• Schools.40A
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The following have been found to constitute
public uses when the condemner was not
a governmental entity:
• Railroad tracks and terminal facilities;41
• Telephone lines and underground fiber
optic cables;42
• Grist mills;43
• Iron works;44
• Electric power facilities;45
• Privately owned turnpikes;46
• Flumes;47
• Telegraph lines and poles;48
• Private water lines;49 and
• Microwave relay towers.50

Property Devoted to Public Use
Property that is devoted to a public use cannot be
condemned for another public use51 in the absence
of legislative authority permitting the condemner
to take property already devoted to a public use.52
The regulation of land uses under the police
power, however, does not result in the property
being devoted to a public use that would
preclude condemnation.53

Necessity
Unlike the review of the legislative body’s
determination of public use, the court has only
a limited review of the necessity to take any
particular parcel of property. The legislative body’s
determination of necessity is conclusive upon the
courts in the absence of a showing of fraudulent or
arbitrary and capricious action by the condemner.54
Arbitrary and capricious actions are willful and
unreasonable actions taken without consideration
for or in disregard of the facts existing at the time
the condemnation was decided upon or within the
foreseeable future.55 An action is not arbitrary and
capricious when exercised honestly and upon due
consideration where there is room for two opinions,
even if the court believes that the condemner erred
in basing its decision on one of the two opinions.56
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Thus, the property owner cannot ask the court to
substitute its judgment for that of the condemner
on what is in the best interest of the public.57 The
court cannot substitute its judgment on the proper
parcel of property to be taken, as distinguished
from similar property in the same area, or determine
the suitability of a particular parcel of property for
the proposed use, or decide the quantity of property
required by the condemner for the proposed use.58

issue becomes final and must be appealed at that
time.65 Thus, there may be two final judgments in
any condemnation action.66

Condemnation for Future Needs
The propriety of the condemner acquiring property
for expected future needs has never been addressed
by a Tennessee court, but other courts have
found that the time of the taking, like the location
and extent of the property to be acquired, is
a question for the legislative branch that will not
be disturbed by the courts absent fraud or arbitrary
and capricious action.59 As long as the future need
for the property can be fairly anticipated by the
condemner, the courts will not interfere with the
condemner’s determination of necessity.60 Since
the condemner in Tennessee is not barred from
the exercise of common sense or good business
judgment in the operation or construction of
public facilities,61 it is likely that Tennessee courts
would permit the condemnation of property the
condemner fairly expects will be needed to satisfy
the condemner’s future needs.

Procedural Issues
Since condemnation cases have the dual nature
mentioned above, challenges to the condemner’s
right to take normally are resolved as a preliminary
matter before the determination of the amount of
just compensation to which the property owner is
entitled.62 The condemner has the burden of proof of
establishing the right to take.63 The determination
of the right to take is a matter for the court and
not the jury.64 If the court finds that the condemner
has the right to take, and the condemner posts
the bond required by statute and takes possession
of the property, the judgment on the right to take
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Chapter Four: Just Compensation
Introduction
The constitutional requirement that private property
not be taken for public use without payment of just
compensation to the property owner1 is satisfied
by the payment of the fair cash value2 or the fair
market value of the property on the date of the
taking for public use.3 The “fair market value“
of the land is the price that a reasonable buyer
would give if he or she were willing to but did not
have to purchase and that a willing seller would
take if he or she were willing to but did not have
to sell the property in question.4 The amount of
just compensation to which the property owner is
entitled is a question for the jury or court acting
as the trier of the facts,5 and the parties have the
right to a trial by jury.6 After the condemner’s right
to take has been established, the burden of proof
shifts to the property owner to show the amount of
just compensation to which he or she is entitled for
the taking.7

initially, the owners of the remaining tracts are not
entitled to benefit from any appreciation in value
resulting from construction of the project.11 This
is known as the “scope of the project” rule. The
condemner has the burden of proof in establishing
that the property in question was within the
scope of the project.12 The condemner need not
show that the property was actually specified in
the original plans for the project so long as it
can be established that during the course of the
planning or original construction of the project,
it became evident that the property in question
would be needed for the project.13 To determine
whether the appreciation in value resulted from the
proposed public improvement, the trial court must
make a preliminary determination on the scope of
the project, which will serve as the basis for the
admissibility of comparable sales that might reflect
the appreciation.14

Establishing Fair Market Value

In establishing the fair market value of the property
being taken, the jury may not consider prices
previously offered by prospective buyers of the
property.15 The price actually paid several years
before the condemnation may also be excluded.15A
The prices at which the property was previously
offered for sale also cannot be considered in
determining the fair market value of the property.16

The fair market value of the property taken by the
condemner must be established as of the date of
the taking.8 Therefore, the enhancement in value or
depreciation in value of the property that occurred
before the taking in anticipation of the completion
of the public improvement may not be considered by
the jury.9 This problem usually is encountered when
a public improvement is constructed in stages or is
enlarged so as to require additional property. If the
property increases in value due to its proximity to
the construction of the public improvement, and
at a later date the condemner decides to acquire
additional land for the expansion of the public
improvement, the condemner is required to pay
for the enhanced value of the property.10
If, on the other hand, the public project from the
beginning contemplated the acquisition of several
parcels of property but only one was acquired
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Evidence of environmental contamination, as well
as the reasonable cost of remediation, is relevant
to the issue of valuation and erroneous exclusion of
this evidence warrants a new trial.16A
All capabilities of the property and all legitimate
uses for which it is available and reasonably
adapted must be considered in determining the
fair market value of the property.17 See also
T.C.A. § 29-17-1004. Therefore the probable
imminent rezoning of the property may be

EMINENT DOMAIN IN TENNESSEE • Municipal Technical Advisory Service

considered in determining the capabilities and uses
for the property.18 Present zoning is only one of
several factors to be considered in valuing land that
is taken. Zoning is not dispositive because zoning
changes may be made to reflect the changing
needs and circumstances of the community. This
same rule applies to deed restrictions.18A Also, the
capability of the property to be developed for one
or more particular uses may be shown so long as
the proposed uses are not unfeasible or remote in
likelihood or in time given the circumstances and
location of the property, and so long as these uses
are not overemphasized.19
Speculative value of property in the hands of
a future owner cannot be considered.20 The rental
value of the property taken may be considered in
estimating the fair market value of the property.21
Ordinarily, the profits of a business located on
the property are not relevant to establish the
fair market value of the property, but there are
exceptions to this rule in circumstances where the
property has special value to the owner and there is
no other evidence upon which to establish the fair
market value of the property.22
The particular use for which the land is most
valuable or to which it is presently adapted may
be considered by the jury in determining the fair
market value of the property, but it may not be the
sole basis for that determination.23 Thus, a witness
may not base his or her estimate of the value
of the property on its value for a single use
such as the “highest and best use.”24 See also
T.C.A. § 29-17-1004. A witness may testify that the
property has a fair market value of a certain amount
and may explain on direct and cross examination
the particular qualities of the property and the
specific uses to which the property may be adapted,
but the witness cannot testify that the property
has a value of a certain amount for “building
lot purposes“ or “for the best use.“25 This rule is
designed to avoid overvaluation of the property by

preventing the jury from giving excessive weight to
the value of the property to the condemner.26
The value of the land to the owner is not ordinarily
relevant if there is a market value for the land.27
A partial exception to this rule may exist when the
property has a special value to the owner, without
possible like value to others who may acquire it.28
Such a special or peculiar value to the owner may
be taken into consideration in determining the fair
market value of the property.29
When title to an entire tax parcel is condemned
in fee, the total amount of damages may not be
less than the latest valuation used by the assessor
of property prior to the taking, less any decrease
in value since then. The assessor’s valuation
may be introduced and admitted into evidence.
T.C.A. § 29-16-114(a)(2).

Comparable Sales
One method of establishing the fair market value of
the property being taken is the introduction of sales
of similar properties.30 Whether a sale is sufficiently
comparable to be admissible is a preliminary
question for the trial court.31 However, the trial
court’s discretion is not unlimited, and the appellate
courts will reverse the decision of the trial court in
the appropriate circumstances.32
For a sale to be sufficiently comparable to
be admissible, it must have been a voluntary sale,
or an arm’s length transaction, and cannot have
been the result of a compromise.33 Therefore
sales to a condemner,34 or under the threat of
condemnation,35 are inadmissible, as are sales of
property upon which are placed unusually stringent
restrictions on the use of the property.36 Sales that
have been affected or influenced by the public
project for which the property is being acquired
will also be inadmissible.37
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If the sale was an arm’s length transaction, the trial
court must next consider whether the properties
are similar in nature and near the same location
and that the time of the sale was at or about the
time of the taking.38 In making this determination,
the trial court will consider the size,39 the time of
the sale,40 changes in conditions since the time
of the sale,41 the current zoning or any imminent
rezoning,42 the location43 and vicinity, proximity to
existing improvements, improvements existing on
the properties, terrain or other geographic features,
and all available uses to which the properties are
adapted.44 The sales do not have to be exactly
comparable in every respect, and there is no general
rule on the degree of similarity required.45
After the trial court determines that a sale is
comparable and may be admitted into evidence,
the weight to be given to the sale is a question
for the jury.46 If a particular sale was made under
exceptional circumstances, these circumstances can
be shown and the jury can determine the probative
force of the sale.47

Opinions as to Value
In addition to using comparable sales to determine
the fair market value of the property taken by
the condemner, and any incidental damages and
incidental benefits to the remainder of the property,
lay48 and expert witnesses49 can give opinion
evidence on the value of the property being taken.
Thus, the owner can give an opinion as to the
fair market value of the property, but that
opinion will be given little weight when founded
on pure speculation.50
The trial court has wide discretion in the admission
of expert testimony on the value of real property.51
Nevertheless, the court cannot permit an expert to
give an opinion as to the value of real property for
a particular purpose, but should require the expert
to base his or her opinion on the fair market value
for all legitimate uses for which the property is
available and reasonably adapted.52
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The expert witness may state his or her opinion as
to the value of the property and the basis on which
he or she arrived at that opinion.53 The answers
given by the expert on cross examination may be
considered by the court and jury in evaluating the
opinion of the expert witness.54
Neither the court nor the jury is bound by the
opinion of the expert witness.55

Incidental Damages
When the condemner takes a part but not all of
a parcel of property, the condemnation statutes
permit the property owner to recover incidental
damages for any injury to the remainder resulting
from the taking. T.C.A. §§ 29-16-114; 29-17-910.
The payment of incidental damages is not required
by the Tennessee Constitution, but rather is
provided by statute.56 Incidental damages are
properly measured by the decline in the fair market
value of the remainder of the property by virtue of
the taking.57 The landowner in an eminent domain
proceeding is not entitled to a jury trial on what
kinds of damages are to be included in an incidental
damages award.57A
The award of incidental damages is limited to
property owners whose property is actually taken
by the condemner.58 Adjacent property owners
whose land is not condemned but is nevertheless
adversely affected by construction of the public
improvement cannot recover incidental damages
under these statutes.59
Where a portion of the property has been taken,
the property owner may recover incidental damages
only upon a showing of some specific injury to the
remainder, or its value, which is the direct result
of the taking.60 A railroad can recover neither
depreciation costs nor damages for increased
exposure to liability from additional crossings
required by a taking for a street crossing a railroad
right of way.60A The injury must be more than an
inconvenience shared by all members of the public;
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rather, it must specifically affect the remainder
of the property that was taken.61 This does not
result in an injury becoming non-compensable
merely because other property owners are similarly
affected.62 If the property owner can establish that
exceptional circumstances attend the taking and
use of the property by the condemner that result in
a special injury to the remainder of the property,
the property owner may recover incidental damages
even if the special injury is common to all property
in the area.63
Whether flooding to the remainder of a land owner’s
property due to road construction was incidental
damage and whether the land owner was estopped
from recovering for inverse condemnation under
a deed provision stating that compensation paid
by the city included “payment for any and all
incidental damages to the remainder compensable
under eminent domain” was an issue for the jury.63A
In addition to diminution in the fair market value of
the remainder, the condemnation statutes include as
incidental damages:
• Reasonable expenses incurred for removing,
relocating, and reinstalling furniture, household
belongings, fixtures, equipment, machinery, or
stock in trade to another location not more than
50 miles distant;
• The costs of any necessary disconnection,
dismounting, or disassembling and loading and
drayage of the chattels;
• Recording fees, transfer taxes, and other similar
expenses incidental to conveying the property
to the condemner;
• Mortgage pre-payment penalties; and
• The proration of real property taxes.
T.C.A. § 29-16-114.
The property owner can recover only moving
expenses that have been actually incurred at the
date of trial or that can be shown to be reasonably
necessary in the future and can be accurately
estimated by witnesses.64 The landowner is entitled

to average hourly wage for labor costs related to
relocation but not the “burden rate” added for the
cost of utilities, health insurance, and retirement.64A
These incidental damages cannot be recovered if the
chattels to be moved are destroyed by fire before
moving.65 Also, moving or relocation expenses
cannot be recovered for the removal of equipment,
fixtures, or other chattels that were not located on
the land taken by the condemner.66
Although not specifically set out by statute, the
following have also been found to constitute
incidental damages to the extent they reduced the
fair market value of the remainder of the property:
• Noise, soot, and inconvenience created by the
operation of a railroad; 67
• Obstruction of view by a highway embankment; 68
• Reasonable apprehension of danger from the
public improvement; 69
• Changes in drainage;70
• Loss of access to an abutting street;71 and
• A decrease in business.71A

Incidental Benefits
The condemner is entitled to have the amount
of incidental damages reduced by the amount of
incidental benefits that accrue to the remainder
as the result of the construction of the public
improvement. T.C.A. §§ 29-16-114; 29-17-910.
Like incidental damages, incidental benefits are
determined independently of the just compensation
required by the Tennessee Constitution.72 Therefore,
incidental benefits cannot be considered in
determining the amount of just compensation to
which the property owner is entitled for the portion
of the property taken by the condemner.73
Incidental benefits include only those benefits
special to the remainder of the property owner’s
property as opposed to the general benefits of
a public improvement shared by the public at
large.74 However, incidental benefits are not
prevented from being special by the fact that
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other properties abutting the public improvement
are similarly benefitted where those benefits are
not common to all the properties in the vicinity.75
Thus, increased accessibility to the property76 or
easy access parking77 may still constitute incidental
benefits even though property owners on the same
street have also gained better access or parking.
On the other hand, a general increase in property
value experienced by all area residents as a result
of street improvements does not constitute an
incidental benefit that may be set off against
incidental damages.78

T.C.A. § 29-17-913. This interest is allowed from
the date of the taking on the amount in excess of
the amount deposited with the clerk of the court.81
Post-judgment interest accrues at the rate of
10 percent per year.82

Procedural Issues
The general rule is that incidental damages and
incidental benefits are to be estimated as of the
date of the taking.79 However, since incidental
damages and incidental benefits are premised on the
impact to the remainder of the property resulting
from construction of the public improvement, proof
showing the damage or benefits occurring after
the taking has been permitted in instances where
the trial occurs long after the public improvement
has been completed.80 Property owners whose
property is being acquired for street, road, highway,
freeway, or parkway purposes are entitled to
obtain a continuance of the condemnation case
until the public improvement is completed to
eliminate uncertainty as to the incidental damages
or incidental benefits that may occur as the result
of the construction. T.C.A. § 29-17-1201. If the
condemnation case is tried before the project is
completed, maps, drawings, and photographs of
the land may be introduced at trial as long as the
evidence would not be misleading.
T.C.A. § 29-17-1202.

Interest
Interest at two percentage points greater than
the prime loan rate established, as of the date of
the taking, by the Federal Reserve System of the
United States must be paid by the condemner on
any judgment obtained by the property owner.
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Chapter Five: Inverse Condemnation
Introduction
As noted in chapter one, the Tennessee
Constitution’s Article I, Section 21, prohibits
the taking of private property for public use
without the payment of just compensation.
A property owner whose property is taken
for a public use without the payment of just
compensation has a remedy for the taking in
a “reverse condemnation“ or “inverse condemnation“
action. T.C.A. § 29-16-123.1 But, this statute
does not provide authority to file suit for inverse
condemnation in a state court against the state.1A
The property owner also may bring an action for
trespass in a proper case and is not limited to
proceeding by the statutory method prescribed for
inverse condemnation actions. The property owner
who sues for damages in a trespass action may also
recover punitive damages in an appropriate case.2

have occurred to private property are sufficient to
constitute a taking for which just compensation
must be paid. Courts have held that the action
of any entity with the power of eminent domain
in carrying out the purposes for which it was
created may constitute a taking when it destroys,
interrupts, or interferes with the common and
necessary use of real property of another, even if
there is no actual entry upon the property.8

Inverse condemnation claims have been classified by
the courts into two general categories: (1) physical
takings, and (2) regulatory takings.3 Physical
takings occur where property in addition to that
previously condemned in formal proceedings is taken
by the condemner without paying just compensation
to the property owner,4 or where an entity with
the power of eminent domain appropriates private
property for public use without instituting formal
condemnation proceedings.5 Regulatory takings
occur when a regulation adopted under the police
power denies an owner economically viable use of
his or her property.6

Thus, as noted in the preceding chapter on
incidental damages, a property owner whose
land is not formally condemned for a public
improvement may not, as a general rule, recover
for the consequential damages resulting from the
construction or operation of a public improvement
located near, but not on, his or her property.11
These non-recoverable damages include all injuries
naturally and unavoidably resulting from the proper,
non-negligent construction or operation of a public
improvement that are shared generally by property
owners whose properties lie within the range
of the inconveniences necessarily incident to
the improvement.º

Federal takings cases had included the test of
whether a regulation substantially advances
a legitimate state interest to determine if a taking
had occurred, but this test has been abrogated.7

Physical Takings
One of the most difficult questions presented in
any takings case is whether the damages that

Not every action by an entity with the power of
eminent domain that damages or interferes with
the use of private property, however, will constitute
a taking.9 Whether a taking has occurred is
a fact-specific determination based on the nature,
extent, and duration of the intrusion onto the
private property.10

Thus, the owner whose property is formally
condemned in part for the construction of a public
improvement will be entitled to recover incidental
damages while the owner whose land is not formally
condemned but nonetheless suffers actual damages
from the construction or operation of a public
improvement nearby will not be entitled to recover
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for these damages. This distinction results from
the eminent domain statutes permitting incidental
damages to be recovered where a portion of a larger
tract of property is taken for a public improvement,
while the inverse condemnation remedy is available
only to owners of property that is taken, and not
just damaged, by an entity with the power of
eminent domain.
Courts have found that a taking has occurred
when the proper non-negligent construction of
a public improvement directly invades or peculiarly
affects private property and creates substantial
and continual interference with the practical use
and enjoyment of the land. Thus, takings have been
found where the entity with the power of eminent
domain failed to acquire drainage easements or
flowage easements sufficient to handle storm water
runoff or other discharges necessarily incidental
to public improvements,13 or diverted a stream to
another property as the result of the construction
of a public improvement,14 or denied access to
a highway as the result of construction on the
highway.15 Takings have also been found where the
entity with the power of eminent domain failed to
acquire adequate slope easements for highways,
resulting in the encroachment of the highway on
private property,16 or failed to acquire aircraft overflight easements across property located adjacent
to airports,17 or failed to acquire interests on
property affected by non-natural electric conditions
produced by an electric street railroad company.18
In each of these cases the courts found that the
nature, extent, and duration of the intrusion on,
or interference with, private property resulted in
the taking.
Mere proof, however, that the construction or
maintenance of a public improvement has resulted
in a loss of profits from a business operated
on property located adjacent to the public
improvement19 or in a decrease in property value20
will be insufficient to establish a taking. A decrease
in business, however, may require compensation.20A
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Another problem that must be confronted when
determining whether or not an injury to private
property constitutes a taking is the distinction
between a nuisance and a taking.21 Courts have
defined a nuisance as anything that annoys or
disturbs the free use of one’s property or that
renders its ordinary use or physical occupation
uncomfortable.22 A temporary nuisance is a nuisance
that can be corrected by the expenditure of labor or
money.23 Courts usually classify as nuisance injuries
to private property that result from the improper,
negligent construction or operation of a public
improvement or that are temporary in nature and
permit successive recoveries by the property owner
until the nuisance is abated.24 Conversely, courts
usually classify as takings injuries to property of
a permanent nature resulting from the proper,
non-negligent construction or operation of a public
improvement and permit only a single recovery.25
Whether a particular activity sufficiently interferes
with the use of private property to constitute
a compensable taking is a matter of degree. The
conceptual difficulty inherent in classifying
a particular activity may be simplified by
visualizing, on a continuum, consequential damages,
nuisance damages, and damages recoverable for
a taking. At one extreme may be placed
consequential damages which, as noted above,
would include all injuries naturally and unavoidably
resulting from the proper, non-negligent
construction or operation of a public improvement
that do not directly invade or peculiarly affect
the plaintiff’s private property, but rather are
shared by the public generally. Consequential
damages are thus analogous to damages caused
by a public nuisance for which a private property
owner cannot recover without establishing damages
attributable to the private nuisance. At the
center of the continuum may be placed nuisance
damages resulting from the improper, negligent
construction or operation of a public improvement
that substantially interferes with the practical use
and enjoyment of the private property and that
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peculiarly affects the property. These damages
are recoverable only under a theory of temporary
private nuisance and are actionable until the
nuisance is finally abated.
At the other extreme are damages recoverable for
a taking, which include those resulting from the
proper, non-negligent construction or operation
of a public improvement that directly invades or
peculiarly affects the private property and creates
a substantial and continuing interference with its
practical use and enjoyment. Thus, damages for
a taking in this sense closely approximate and may,
in a practical sense, be virtually indistinguishable
from those recoverable for a permanent private
nuisance. Since this discussion reveals that the
finding of a taking is a fact-specific inquiry, it is
helpful to review the circumstances under which
courts have found a physical taking.

Impairment of Easements
of Access and Way
Courts in Tennessee have recognized that a property
owner has an easement of access between his or
her land and the abutting street, which extends
to the center of the abutting street, absent any
evidence to the contrary.26 Although as noted in the
preceding chapter some courts have found that an
impairment of a property owner’s easement of access
can constitute incidental damages to the remainder
of property when a portion of the property is taken
in a condemnation action, other courts have held
that any impairment of this right of ingress and
egress constitutes a taking for which the owner
may recover just compensation in an inverse
condemnation action.27 Thus property owners have
been allowed to recover just compensation where
the owner’s access was destroyed by a change
in the grade of a street or highway,28 or by the
construction of a fence,29 or by the construction of
a drainage ditch alongside a highway.30 Incidental
damages were allowed when curbing impaired full
access from the abutting street.30A

In addition to an easement of access, a private
property owner whose property abuts a public street
or road has an easement of way, or right of passage,
in the street abutting his or her property.31 This
easement of way is a private property right that
exists in addition to the right to use the street in
common with the general public.32 This easement
extends along any street or alley upon which the
owner’s property abuts, in either direction, to the
next intersecting street.33 This right usually is
impaired by the closing of public streets or roads.34
No recovery has been allowed when a two-way
street abutting an owner’s property has been
changed to a one-way street, as this constitutes
a valid exercise of the police power for which the
payment of just compensation is required only in
unusual circumstances.35

Water Damage
Takings have been found where the construction
or operation of a public improvement resulted in
recurring flooding of private property36 or increased
the amount of storm water runoff that caused
erosion.37 A taking has also been found where water
was regularly discharged from water treatment
facilities across adjoining private property,38 where
a public improvement altered the flow of a stream
and caused erosion,39 and where the construction
of a public improvement diverted a stream that
previously flowed across private property.40

Aircraft Overflights
A taking of airspace above private property may
result from frequent low flights of aircraft that
substantially interfere with the practical use and
enjoyment of the property.41 Noise, vibrations, and
airplane pollutants unaccompanied by an actual
physical invasion of the airspace immediately over
the property owner’s land may also constitute
a taking. Direct overflight is not required.42
A taking has also been found when trees were cut
on private property in an airport approach zone
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established by a municipal ordinance.43 The court
found that removing the trees and limiting the
height of buildings in the airport approach zone
constituted a taking.44

Takings Prior to Condemnation
Where a condemner appropriates private property
prior to instituting formal condemnation
proceedings, a taking obviously occurs. Thus,
a taking occurred where electric transmission lines
were constructed before a condemnation proceeding
was filed.45 In that situation the appropriation
is illegal until just compensation is paid to the
property owner, and the condemner acquires
only a possessory right that is not transferable.46
Takings have also been found where a condemner
filed condemnation proceedings but nonsuited
the proceedings before paying just compensation
to the property owner,47 where a municipality
annexed a subdivision and asserted ownership over
the water and sewer system serving it without
paying just compensation to its owners,48 where
the condemner failed to acquire the interest of the
lessee of property conveyed to the condemner by
the lessor,49 and where the condemner failed to
acquire the property interests in certain restrictive
covenants from the residents of a subdivision before
constructing a public improvement in violation of
those covenants.50 The property owner’s sole remedy
for these takings is an inverse condemnation action,
as the courts have specifically rejected attempts
to enjoin51 or eject52 the condemner who has
taken the property without instituting
condemnation proceedings.

Additional Takings
A significant issue presented in any case where
a property owner seeks to recover just compensation
for the taking of private property in addition
to that previously acquired by the condemner is
whether the property owner is estopped by the
prior condemnation award or deed to the condemner
from recovering additional compensation.53 The
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condemnation award encompasses all damages,
present and future, that the property owner
knew or should have known would result from the
proper construction or operation of the public
improvement.54 The burden of proof of showing
an estoppel is on the condemner, unless the
language of the condemnation decree or deed
is unambiguous.55
An exception to this rule applies for losses or
damage that could not reasonably have been
anticipated by either party or, if alleged by the
property owner in the condemnation proceeding,
would have been rejected as speculative or
conjectural.56 Under this exception, recovery
has been permitted for landslides onto private
property that resulted from cuts made during
the construction of a highway,57 for damage to
a dam caused by excessive blasting during the
construction of a pipeline,58 and for damage to
a wall caused by blasting for electric transmission
lines.59 Recovery has been denied when the property
owner knew or should have known that curbs
limiting access to his property would be constructed
as part of a highway project60 and where the fill
from a street that was elevated by the condemner
spread onto adjoining property since the owner
knew or should have known that the fill would have
encroached upon his property when he conveyed
a portion of the property to the condemner.61

Regulatory Takings
The United States Supreme Court revolutionized the
law of regulatory takings in 1987 when it held that
a local government must pay just compensation for
temporary regulatory takings.62 In that same year
the U.S. Supreme Court decided two other cases
that dealt with regulatory takings.63 Since those
decisions, regulatory taking cases have flooded the
courts as property owners seek to recover for the
diminution in the value of their property resulting
from the enforcement of police power regulations
affecting private property. Not surprisingly, most of
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these cases involve land use regulations adopted by
local governments.
Although the inverse condemnation statute would
not appear to be applicable by its terms to
a regulatory taking of private property where no
physical invasion or interference is involved, the
U.S. Supreme Court64 and a Tennessee court65 have
held that an inverse condemnation action could
be maintained based on unreasonable restrictions
placed on the use of property by a regulation
adopted under the police power.
A regulation adopted under the police power can
result in a taking of private property for which the
payment of just compensation is required if the
regulation denies the owner economically viable
use of his or her property.66 Temporary moratoria on
development are not subject to a per se taking rule
and may withstand a taking claim. The standards
set out in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City apply in these cases.67A Unreasonable denials of
proposals for development, however, may engender
liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and a jury trial is
available to determine these claims.67B
The taking test requires an inquiry into whether
the regulation denies the property owner the
economically viable use of his or her property.68 This
is a highly fact-specific inquiry that is not subject
to a set formula.69 Whether a taking has occurred
is a question of degree and cannot be determined
by general propositions.70 The courts have used
ad hoc factual inquiries, relying on factors such
as the character of the governmental action, the
economic impact of the regulation on the property
owner, the interference with reasonable investmentbacked expectations, and the nature and extent
of the interference with the rights in the property
as a whole.71 Where a state regulation prohibits all
economically beneficial use of land, to be imposed
without necessity of compensation, it must do no
more than duplicate what could otherwise be done
under the state’s nuisance laws.71A

In considering the economic impact of the
regulation on private property, the courts recognize
that the mere diminution of property value, or the
substantial reduction of the attractiveness of the
property to potential purchasers, or the denial of
the ability to exploit a property right the owner
previously believed was available, will not suffice
to establish a taking.72 The inquiry must instead
focus on the value of the remaining uses to which
the property may be put73 and a comparison of the
owner’s investment or basis with the market value
of the property subject to the regulation.74 When
considering whether the regulation interferes with
the owner’s investment-backed expectations, the
court must determine that the expectations were
reasonable, or at least consistent with the law in
force at the time the expectation was formed.75
The purchase price is only one of the factors that
should be considered in determining whether
a regulation interferes with reasonable investmentbacked expectations.76
Courts applying these factors have found takings
in instances where there was no value for the uses
remaining for the property after the adoption of
the regulation77 and where there was a loss of
96 percent of the possible rate of return on an
investment.78 Courts have rejected takings claims
where valuable uses of the property remained after
the imposition of the regulation, even if those uses
were not the most valuable uses.79

Exactions
Municipalities often use exactions to require
developers and property owners to provide needed
public amenities. A developer or property owner
must be compensated for the exaction if there is no
nexus between the exaction and a public purpose.80
Courts have found that requiring a property
owner to grant a public easement along a beach
as a condition to construct a house on a beach
constituted a taking since the exaction did not
protect the public’s ability to see the beach81 and
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that requiring a dedication of land for a greenway
and bicycle/pedestrian pathway did not bear the
necessary relationship to problems created by
a commercial development to avoid a taking.81A
In addition the regulation must be reasonably
related to the public need or burden that
a property owner’s use of his or her property
creates or to which it contributes.82 Therefore,
regulations that impose land dedication
requirements to develop property may constitute
a taking if the property owner is required to
dedicate property in excess of the amount that
is necessary to offset the additional burdens on
the public interest resulting from the use of his
or her property.83 The cost to the landowner must
be “roughly proportional” to the additional public
burden caused by the development.84A

For taking claims brought in federal courts there is
a second ripeness requirement — the property
owner must first have sought just compensation
in state courts before bringing a takings claim
in federal courts.88 Thus, a property owner in
Tennessee must first bring an inverse condemnation
action in the state courts before filing suit in the
federal courts to recover just compensation for
a regulatory taking.

Measure of Damages

A Tennessee case upheld the rezoning of property
on the condition that the landowner dedicate
a 12-foot right-of-way for future road expansion.
The court applied a “fairly debatable” rule to the
rezoning and dedication requirement. It should
be noted, however, that a statute specifically
authorized conditional zoning in the city.84B

The normal measure of damages in an inverse
condemnation case is the same as in any other
condemnation case.89 Where a permanent regulatory
taking has occurred, the measure of damages is as
discussed in chapter four. Where a temporary taking
occurs, the property owner is entitled to the value
of the use of the property during the time of the
temporary taking.90 The value of the temporary use
of property normally is measured by the difference
in rental value resulting from the imposition of the
regulation.91 Some courts, however, have permitted
the property owner to recover in excess of the rental
value of the property based on the fair market value
of the right to develop the property.92

Ripeness

Statute of Limitations

Since the determination of whether a particular
regulation has resulted in a taking of private
property depends upon the economic impact of the
regulation, a takings claim is not ripe, and cannot
be considered by a court, until the property owner
has obtained a final decision from the appropriate
governmental agency on the application of the
regulation to the particular parcel of property.85 In
the zoning context this final decision requirement
forces the property owner to obtain two decisions
from the governmental entity: (1) a rejected
development plan, and (2) a denial of a variance.86
Until the property owner has obtained a final
decision, it is not possible to determine the actual
economic impact of a regulation on the property
in question.87
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Inverse condemnation suits must be commenced
within one year after the land has been
actually taken possession of and the work of
the proposed internal improvement begun.
T.C.A. § 29-16-124.93 In establishing the date the
taking occurred, which commences the running of
the statute of limitations, the courts consider the
date of the actual injury to the property or the date
the owner had reasonable notice or knowledge of
the injury.94
These general rules are somewhat difficult to apply
where the private property is taken due to a public
improvement located on adjacent property or is due
to a regulatory taking. The statute of limitations
was found not to bar a suit filed five years after
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a public improvement was completed on adjacent
property but filed within one year of the date
flooding occurred on the private property.95 In
a case involving a taking of airspace due to aircraft
overflights, the court found that the operative date
for the purposes of the statute of limitations was
the date that direct overflights of low-flying
aircraft commenced over private property, instead
of the date the property for the airport was
condemned or the date the construction of the
airport was completed.96
The statute of limitations does not commence until
the landowner knows or should have known that
the injury to his or her property was permanent
in nature.97 Thus, where a property owner received
repeated assurances from the condemner over
a two-year period that flooding caused by highway
construction would be corrected, the court held that
the statute of limitations did not bar the suit since
the court found that the suit was filed within one
year of the date the property owner discovered that
the condemner had failed to correct the problem.98

Attorney, Engineer,
and Appraisal Fees
If a property owner prevails in an inverse
condemnation case, he or she is entitled to
recover from the condemner his or her reasonable
costs, disbursements, and expenses, including
reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering
fees actually incurred because of the proceedings.
T.C.A. § 29-16-123. The trial court must award
these fees to the property owner if a demand is
made by the property owner, although the court
has the discretion to determine the reasonableness
of those fees.102

A similar result was obtained in a case involving
a municipal ordinance that limited the height
of buildings that could be constructed in an
airport glide path.99 The court rejected the
municipality’s argument that the passage of the
ordinance commenced the running of the statute of
limitations, holding instead that the statute began
to run only when the owner‘s property was injured
by the taking and not when he or she had notice of
the taking.100
In instances where the condemner nonsuits
a condemnation case after commencing construction
of a public improvement, the statute of limitations
began to run on the date the nonsuit was entered
rather than the date construction
was commenced.101
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Chapter Six: Leasehold Damages
INTRODUCtion
It has been held that a leasehold constitutes
a compensable property interest under the law
of eminent domain.1 This interest has been
characterized as the right of the lessee to remain in
undisturbed possession of the leased premise until
the expiration of his term.2 A lessee’s entitlement to
damages is not limited to cases where the leasehold
property is actually taken or destroyed, but extends
even to cases where impairment of access to the
leasehold property can be shown.3 A tenant also
is entitled to recover compensation where the
condemnation of a part of the leased premises
destroys the value of the leasehold.4

Valuation of the Leasehold
The lessee is entitled to any excess in value of
his or her unexpired leasehold over and above the
rentals that would be due for the unexpired term.5
In other words, he or she is entitled to recover the
fair market value of his or her leasehold interest
less the rents he or she must pay to the landlord.6
While evidence of a property owner’s business profit
normally is not allowed in condemnation cases,
it may be admissible under the peculiar facts of
a case to show the fair market value of the lessee’s
interest.7 In the event of a partial taking of the
leasehold, the lessee is entitled to recover the
difference in value of the lease before the taking
and the value of the lease after the taking.8
By statute, incidental damages to the leasehold
include the lessee’s moving expenses,9
T.C.A. § 29-16-114, and where only a portion of the
leasehold is acquired, any damage to the remainder
of the leasehold.10
Where a partial taking of property subject to
a leasehold occurs, the jury must first determine the
total amount of just compensation for the taking,
including the fair, reasonable cash market value
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of the property taken on the date of the taking,
and incidental damages, if any, to that portion
of the property remaining.11 In determining the
total fair market value of the fee, the jury should
consider the leasehold as one element of the total
fair market value of the property, as the leasehold
indicates one available use of the property.12 The
total compensation is to include all losses suffered
by all parties having an interest in the property
affected and cannot exceed the value of the fee,
unencumbered by the lease on the date of taking.13
The jury then apportions the total compensation
between the landlord and tenant.14

Apportionment
In the typical condemnation case involving leased
premises, the property owner and lessee are joined
as parties, and the lessee is awarded a portion of
the damages assessed as the value of the total
property condemned. As noted above, the total
compensation awarded to the owner and lessee may
not exceed the value of the unencumbered fee, and
this value, once established, may not be further
increased because of the existence of an unexpired
lease at the time of condemnation.15 In other words,
the value of the leasehold is considered to be an
integral part of the total value of the unencumbered
tract of land.16
The jury should then apportion the total
compensation (fair market value plus incidental
damages) between lessor and lessee by determining
the lessee’s interest, which is the fair market
value of the leasehold on the property minus rent
actually called for in the lease plus incidental
damages to the leasehold, with the remainder
of the property’s fair market value going to the
lessor.17 This formula for apportionment is applicable
regardless of whether a long-term or short-term
lease is involved.18
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The condemner may specify in the condemnation
petition the various interests of the lessor and
lessee, apportion the amount deposited with the
court, and settle the case with either the lessor
or the lessee.19 If the condemner follows this
procedure, the lessee or lessor may then withdraw
its amount in full satisfaction of its claim.20

Appeal
Both the property owner and the lessee have an
independent right to appeal the amount of damages
awarded; joinder of parties is not necessary.21
On appeal, the court may increase the award to
the appellant as long as it determines that the
initial award did not accurately reflect the fair
market value of the unencumbered fee22 or did not
reflect the total aggregate amount of incidental
damages.23 Thus, any relief granted on appeal must
be through an increase of the total award rather
than a reallocation of the lower court’s award.24
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Chapter Seven: The Uniform Relocation Assistance
and Real Property Acquisition Acts
Introduction
The Federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and
Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 19701
was enacted for the purpose of providing fair and
equitable treatment of persons displaced as a result
of federal and federally assisted programs,2 as
well as consistent treatment of owners during the
actual land acquisition.3 The provisions of the act
are mandatory and apply to any public agency that
administers programs supported at least in part by
federal funds. The act consists of three subchapters:
(1) General Provisions, which defines terms used in
the act;4 (2) Uniform Relocation Assistance, which
is concerned with moving and related expenses,
replacement housing payments, relocation
assistance advisory services, and the federal share
of the cost of such payments and services;5 and
(3) Uniform Real Property Acquisition Policy, which
sets out the procedures to be followed in acquiring
real property.6
In 1972, Tennessee enacted the Uniform Relocation
Assistance Act of 1972, which generally followed the
provisions of the federal act and had the effect of
making relocation assistance and land acquisition
procedures mandatory for any projects conducted
by state agencies or supported by state financial
assistance. T.C.A. §§ 13-11-101 et seq. The Tennessee
act was amended in 1980 to also include any
projects by a municipality or a county that received
federal or state financial assistance.
The focus of this chapter will be on land acquisition
procedures, since these are of considerable
importance to attorneys representing condemners
or condemnees. The federal government has
promulgated governmentwide regulations for real
property acquisition,7 which have been adopted by
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reference by such agencies as the Tennessee
Valley Authority,8 the Environmental Protection
Agency,9 and the Department of Housing and
Urban Development.10

Appraisal Procedure
Before the acquisition of any tract of property by
a public agency subject to the federal and/or state
relocation acts, a full appraisal of the tract must be
made. The regulations generally require that:
1. The property be appraised before the initiation
of any negotiations with the property owner;
2. The owner or his designated representative
be given an opportunity to accompany the
appraiser during his inspection of the property;
3. The acquiring agency establish the amount
it believes to be just compensation before
initiating any negotiations with the property
owner; and
4. The acquiring agency make a written offer to
the property owner for the full amount believed
to be the just compensation. The written offer
must be accompanied by a written summary
statement of the offer explaining the amount
of the offer, the description of the property
being acquired, and an identification of any
improvements being acquired.11
The agency must make reasonable efforts to
contact the owner to discuss the offer and explain
the basis for the offer and the acquisition policies
of the agency. The owner must be given
a reasonable opportunity to consider the offer
and present material the owner believes is relevant
to determining the amount of just compensation
to which the owner is entitled. The agency must
consider the owner’s presentation and must update
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its appraisal if the owner’s information or any
material change in the character or the condition of
the property indicates the need for a new appraisal
or if there has been a significant delay since the
time the appraisal was completed. The agency
cannot advance the time of condemnation or take
any other coercive action to induce a settlement by
the owner.12
The type of appraisal that must be obtained by
the agency is determined by the complexity of the
appraisal problem.13 The appraisal must conform
to minimum standards set by each agency and
with commonly accepted appraisal practice if the
appraisal does not require an in-depth analysis.14 If
an in-depth analysis is required, a detailed appraisal
must be performed that conforms to nationally
recognized appraisal standards, including, if
appropriate, the Uniform Acquisition Standards for
Federal Land Acquisition.15 At a minimum a detailed
appraisal must include:16
1. The purpose and/or function of the appraisal,
a description of the estate being appraised,
and a statement of the assumptions and
limiting conditions affecting the appraisal;
2. An accurate description of the physical
characteristics of the property (and any
remainder if a partial taking will occur),
a statement of known and observed
encumbrances, if any, title information,
location, zoning, present use, an analysis of
highest and best use, and at least a five-year
sales history of the property;
3. A description of all relevant and reliable
approaches to value used consistent with
commonly accepted appraisal practice (market
data, income, or replacement cost). If more
than one approach is used, there must be
an analysis and reconciliation of approaches
to value;
4. A description of comparable sales, including
the parties to the transaction, source and
method of financing, and verification by the
parties involved;

5. A statement of the value of the real property
to be acquired, and if a partial taking is
proposed, a statement of the damages and
benefits, if any, to the remainder; and
6. The effective date of the appraisal, signature,
and certification of the appraiser.
The appraiser is required, to the extent permitted
by applicable law, to disregard any decrease or
increase in the fair market value of the property
caused by the project for which the property is
being acquired or by the likelihood that the property
would be acquired for the project, otherthan due
to physical deterioration within the reasonable
control of the owner.17
Once the appraisal is completed, the agency must
have the appraisal reviewed by a review appraiser.18
The review appraiser must examine the appraisal
to assure that it meets all applicable requirements,
and must seek any necessary corrections. The
review appraiser then either approves the appraisal
or develops a new appraisal consistent with the
above requirements.
Before the agency can require the owner to
surrender possession of the real property, the owner
must be paid the agreed upon purchase price, or
if no agreement has been reached, deposit with
the court an amount not less than the approved
appraisal for the fair market value of the property
or the amount of the court’s award of compensation
in the condemnation action. In exceptional
circumstances the agency can obtain a right-ofentry for construction purposes prior to making the
payment available to the owner.19
Although the public agency may not pay
less than the approved purchase price, as
determined by its review appraiser, it may,
under certain circumstances, make an offer of
settlement in excess of that amount. In arriving
at a determination to make an administrative
settlement, the agency should take the following
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factors into consideration:20
1 The appraiser’s opinion of value;
2. Any recent court awards for similar
type property;
3. The estimated trial costs; and
4. Valuation problems with the property
in question.
The agency is required to reimburse property owners
for recording fees, transfer taxes, and similar costs
incidental to conveying real property; penalty
costs for pre-payment of any pre-existing recorded
mortgage, entered into in good faith, encumbering
the property; and the pro rata portion of real
property taxes paid by the owner that are allocable
to a period subsequent to the date of title vesting
with the agency or the effective date of possession
of the property by the agency, whichever is earlier.21
The owner is also entitled to be reimbursed for his
reasonable expenses, including attorney, appraisal,
and engineering fees actually incurred because of
a condemnation proceeding if:
1. The court determines that the agency cannot
acquire the property in question;
2. The condemnation case is abandoned by
the agency other than under an agreed
upon settlement; or
3. The court having jurisdiction renders
a judgment in favor of the owner in
an inverse condemnation case or the
agency settles such a case.22
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Chapter Eight: Forms
Form 1
PETITION FOR CONDEMNATION
Petitioner _______________ respectfully states as follows:
1. Petitioner is a municipality and public corporation of the state of Tennessee and has the power
of condemnation and eminent domain for public purposes when public convenience requires it pursuant to
_______________ (insert charter or private act section). This petition is filed pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated, Sections 29-17-901 et seq., (or 29-16-101 et seq., if jury of view procedure is used) to acquire
certain property rights for the completion of _____________ (identify project) with specific authority as set
out in ____________________ (identify ordinance or resolution authorizing condemnation for project).
2. The property rights sought to be acquired are part of the property rights in real estate located
in the _______________ (identify civil district) District of ____________ County, Tennessee, conveyed to
______________ (insert owner’s name) from _____________ (insert immediate predecessor in title) of record
in Book ___________, Page ____________, Register’s Office for ______________ County, Tennessee. This
property is described more particularly as follows:
[Insert description]
All as more particularly shown on the drawing or map attached as Exhibit ___________.
3. Petitioner has determined that respondent(s) owns the entire fee simple interest of the abovedescribed real estate, subject to the encumbrances set out below:
[List encumbrances]
4. Petitioner has determined the amount to which the respondent(s) is entitled is $_________, and
this amount is deposited with the clerk of the court.
5. [Add if jury of view is used] Petitioner has filed this petition for the purpose of obtaining the
issuance of a writ of inquiry of damages and the appointment of a jury of view pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated § 29-16-101 et seq.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner prays:
1. That a hearing be had in this matter on an early date and at the hearing, petitioner receive the
right to possession and, if necessary, a writ of possession issue to the Sheriff of ____________ County to put
the petitioner in possession, and
[or if jury of view procedure is requested]
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1. That a hearing be held on this matter on an early date and at that hearing the court issue a writ of
inquiry of damages and appoint a jury of view;
2. That an Order of Reference be entered to determine the amount of taxes due petitioner on said
property and said amount to be paid to petitioner;
3. That all additional proceedings be had in this matter and at the final hearing
of this cause, petitioner, its successors and assigns, be decreed the property interests set out above; and
4. That petitioner have any and all additional relief to which it is entitled including the assessment of
costs as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-17-912.
						

Respectfully submitted,

						
						
						

____________________________________
Counsel for Petitioner,
City/Town of ________________________

Cost Bond
(Requirements for cost bond language vary by jurisdiction.)
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Form 2A
SERVICE BY SHERIFF
To (identify name and address of respondents)
NOTICE
Take NOTICE that on the ______ day of _____________, 20___, Petitioner ______________ filed
a petition in this court against you, praying for the condemnation of property rights in the real estate fully
described in the petition, a copy of which accompanies this NOTICE. You are further notified that the petition
will be presented to the court for hearing at
9 a.m. on the _________ day of _____________, 20___, in the Circuit Court, to determine whether
petitioner should be granted an order of possession, entitling it to immediate possession of the property
rights described in the petition.
You must plead, answer, or except to the petition as provided by law, or a judgment will be taken as
confessed against you and the matter proceeded with as provided by law.
(Include following two paragraphs if using supplementary procedure)
You are further notified, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-17-903, that after the expiration
of thirty days from the date of giving of this NOTICE, if the petitioner’s right to condemn and acquire the
property rights described in the petition is not questioned or contested by written formal objection filed
with the clerk of this court and served upon the petitioner’s attorney, the petitioner may take possession of
the property rights sought. If necessary to place the petitioner in possession, the court shall issue a Writ of
Possession to the Sheriff of ____________ County to put the petitioner in possession of the property rights.
If you desire to contest the taking by condemnation under the laws of eminent domain, you must
appear at the time designated after having filed your written formal objection. If you fail to appear or choose
not to appear, an Order of Possession will be entered granting to the petitioner the property rights described.
This hearing, however, will not be concerned with the value of your property or your interest therein and will
not be concerned with the just compensation to which you are entitled.
This ______ day of _____________, 20___.
																
							
Circuit Court Clerk				
							
____________________________
													
							
							

By ____________________________
Deputy Clerk
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OFFICER’S RETURN
I certify that I served this NOTICE with a copy of the Petition for Condemnation, upon serving the
above-named respondent(s), by personally delivering a copy to the respondent(s), this ______ day of
_____________, 20___.

				

SHERIFF OF ______________ COUNTY, TENNESSEE

				

BY _______________________________________
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Form 2B
SERVICE BY MAIL
To (identify name and address of respondents)
NOTICE
Take NOTICE that on the ______ day of _____________, 20___, Petitioner _______________ filed
a petition in this court against you, praying for the condemnation of property rights in the real estate fully
described in the petition, a copy of which accompanies this NOTICE. You are further notified that the petition
will be presented to the court for a hearing at 9 a.m. on the ______ day of _____________, 20___, in
the Circuit Court, to determine whether petitioner should be granted an order of possession, entitling it to
immediate possession of the property rights described in the petition.
You must plead, answer, or except to the petition as provided by law, or a judgment will be taken as
provided by law.
(Include the following two paragraphs if using supplementary procedure)
You are further notified, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-17-903, that after the expiration
of thirty days from the date of the giving of this NOTICE, if the petitioner’s right to condemn and acquire
the property rights described in the petition is not questioned or contested by written formal objection filed
with the clerk of this court and served upon the petitioner’s attorney, the petitioner may take possession of
the property rights sought. If necessary to place the petitioner in possession, the court shall issue a Writ of
Possession to the Sheriff of ___________ County to put the petitioner in possession of his property rights.
If you desire to contest the taking by condemnation under the laws of eminent domain, you must
appear at the time designated after having filed your written formal objection. If you fail to appear or choose
not to appear, an Order of Possession will be entered granting to the petitioner the property rights described.
This hearing, however, will not be concerned with the value of your property or your interest therein and will
not be concerned with the just compensation to which you are entitled.
		
This ______ day of _____________, 20___.
																
							
Circuit Court Clerk
							

____________________________

							
							

By ____________________________
Deputy Clerk
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that this NOTICE and a copy of the Petition for Condemnation has been mailed to all
respondents, by U.S. Certified Mail, this ______ day of _____________, 20___.
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_______________________
Attorney for Petitioner
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Form 3
MOTION FOR NOTICE BY PUBLICATION

Petitioner ______________________ pursuant to Rule 4.05 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure,
Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 29-16-105 and 21-1-203, respectfully moves for an Order that notice of the
Petition for Condemnation filed upon the respondents, ________________, be made by publication and for
grounds states that the residence of these respondents is unknown and cannot be ascertained upon diligent
inquiry. Petitioner relies on the affidavit of its counsel of record, ________________, filed in support of
sthis motion.

								

Respectfully submitted,

								
								

_______________________					
Attorney for Petitioner
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Form 4
AFFIDAVIT OF ________________ (CITY ATTORNEY)

State of Tennessee
County of _________________

I, _______________, being first duly sworn, state as follows:
1.
Affiant is a properly licensed attorney in the state of Tennessee and is the attorney for the
petitioner, ____________________, in this case.
2.
Affiant states that the property rights sought are part of certain property known as
_____________________ (describe property).
3.
Affiant states that he has made numerous inquiries and has obtained an extensive title
search in attempts to locate the respondent(s), ______________. A copy of that title search is attached
as Exhibit A.
4.
Affiant states that he has made a diligent effort to locate the (names/addresses) of the
respondent(s) and has been unsuccessful.
FURTHER, AFFIANT SAITH NOT.
			

_________________________________

Sworn to and subscribed before me a Notary Public, this ______ day of _____________, 20___.

					
					

_________________________
Notary Public

My Commission Expires ___________________
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Form 5
ORDER OF PUBLICATION
It appearing to the court from the affidavit of _________________, attorney for the petitioner, that
respondent(s), _________________, are (unknown or non-residents of the county of _________ and the
state of Tennessee) and ordinary service of process cannot be had upon them;
It is ORDERED, that publication of this order be made for four consecutive weeks in the
_________________, (specify newspaper) a newspaper published in ___________ County, Tennessee,
notifying the respondent(s), __________________, that they are required to answer to make defense to
the Petition for Condemnation in the office of the Circuit Court Clerk of _____________ County, Tennessee,
within 30 days after the fourth weekly publication of this order and that, upon their failure to do so,
the Petition for Condemnation will be taken as admitted by them and the case set for hearing without
their presence.
															
								
_____________________________
								
Circuit Court Judge

Approved for Entry

____________________________
Attorney for Petitioner
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Form 6
ORDER OF POSSESSION
This cause was heard on the ______ day of _____________, 20___, to determine whether the
petitioner should be granted possession of the respondents’ property. Based upon the pleadings, exhibits, as
well as the entire record,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED by the court that petitioner have and receive title and possession to the
property rights sought to be condemned, and that a Writ of Possession issue, if necessary, in order to put
petitioner in possession of the property, being more particularly described as follows:
[insert legal description of property being acquired]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that this matter be referred to the clerk of the
court to determine past due and unpaid county/municipal taxes that are a lien upon the property.
The clerk of this court will make out and certify to the petitioner, _______________, a copy of this
Order of Possession.
ALL FURTHER MATTERS ARE RESERVED.
ENTERED this ______ day of _____________, 20___.
																
								
________________________
								
Circuit Court Judge
							
Approved for Entry

_______________________
Attorney for Petitioner
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Form 7
ORDER SUSTAINING PETITION
FOR CONDEMNATION AND ORDERING WRIT OF INQUIRY
This cause came on to be heard on the ______ day of _____________, 20___, before the Honorable
__________________, Judge of the ________________ Circuit Court of ____________ County, Tennessee,
upon the Petition for Condemnation and Notice to respondents. It appearing to the court that the petition
and notice have been served, or publication made, as required by law, and that the cause is before the court
on application to sustain a petition and for a writ of inquiry of damages and the appointment of a jury of
view; and it further appearing that the respondents are before the court and that petitioner has the legal
power and authority to acquire [insert the interest sought to be condemned] under the eminent domain laws
of the state of Tennessee to the following described property located in _____________ County, Tennessee:
[insert a description of the property]
Respondents’ right of trial by petit jury to determine the amount of compensation to which they are entitled
for this taking is not affected by the transfer of title to petitioner.
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
1. That the Petition for Condemnation of the property described above is sustained.
2. That the following persons are nominated and appointed to act as a Jury of View as provided by the
eminent domain laws of Tennessee:
		
		
		
		
		
		

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Alternate:

3. That the clerk shall issue a writ of inquiry to the sheriff commanding him to summons the Jury
of View to appear in open court on the ______ day of _____________, 20___, at _________, and no other
notice need be given, there to be impaneled and sworn, after which they will proceed immediately to the
property sought to be condemned and examine it, hear testimony of witnesses, but no argument of counsel,
and set apart by metes and bounds the land to be condemned, and assess damages as required by law, reduce
their report to writing and deliver it to the sheriff, who will make his return to the court.
		

This ______ day of _____________, 20___.
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________________________________
Circuit Court Judge

Approved for Entry

__________________________
Attorney for Petitioner
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Form 8
WRIT OF INQUIRY
State of Tennessee
County of ___________________
TO THE SHERIFF OF _____________________ COUNTY, TENNESSEE
A petition has been filed in the Circuit Court of ___________________ County, Tennessee, for the
condemnation of certain rights described fully in the petition.
Now, therefore, as provided by the eminent domain laws of the state of Tennessee, you are
commanded to summon the following to act as a Jury of View and to appear on the ______ day of
_____________, 20___, at _______ o’clock in open court in the Circuit Court of _____________________
County, Tennessee, at [insert the place where the court sits]:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Alternative:
The Jury of View will be sworn and instructed, and will go immediately to the premises, hear the
testimony of witnesses, but no argument of counsel, and set apart by metes and bounds the property to be
condemned, and inquire and assess the damages resulting from this taking, and report its findings in writing
by each member of the Jury of View or a majority of them, which report shall be delivered to you and by you
returned to this court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal of this court on the ______ day of
_____________, 20___.
															
			
_____________________________________________
			
[insert herein the name of the clerk of court]

			
			

By _______________________
(Clerk or Deputy Clerk)
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Form 9
REPORT OF THE JURY OF VIEW
We, the Jury of View, summoned, appointed, and sworn, as provided by the laws of the state of
Tennessee, and by orders of the court made and entered in this proceeding were directed to lay off by metes
and bounds the property interests condemned, and to inquire and assess damages to the property interest
taken by Petitioner ______________. We report as follows:
We went upon the property condemned on the ______ day of _____________, 20___, and examined
this property by personal inspection and heard evidence, but no argument of counsel, of the value of the
property interests to be condemned, and we allot and set apart to the petitioner, property situated in
________________ County, Tennessee, and described as follows:
[insert a description of the property taken]
And we find the fair cash value of the property condemned as being $_____, and that this sum
consists of the following amounts:
			
			

_______________ Fair market value of land taken
_______________ Incidental damages

The members of the Jury of View met on the following dates and respectfully request a fee for each.
Dates _________________
		
_________________
This ______ day of _____________, 20___.
				
				
				
				
				

_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
Members of the Jury of View

Received from the Jury of View and returned to the clerk of the court this ______ day of
_____________, 20___.
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Sheriff of __________________ County
___________________________________
BY
Deputy Sheriff				
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Form 10
ORDER CONFIRMING REPORT OF THE JURY OF VIEW
It appearing to the court that the Jury of View having met and reported to the court that the fair cash
value of the property rights condemned is $_______ (Optional: including incidental damages to the residue
of $______,) and having deposited with the clerk of this court the sum of $__________.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
1. That the report of the Jury of View is confirmed both as to the appropriation of the property rights
condemned and the award of damages resulting from the taking, and that petitioner, _______________,
upon payment to the clerk for the use of respondents the amount of damages assessed by the Jury of View
and all costs of this cause, is adjudged to have acquired the following described property:
[insert a description of the property rights being condemned]
and that the property rights thus acquired and possession is divested out of respondents and vested in
petitioner, ______________, and any other liens or encumbrances for taxes or the claim of any party are
transferred to the funds deposited or secured.
2. That respondents [insert the name or names of all respondents], have and recover of petitioner the
sum of $_______ the same being the fair cash value of the property rights taken, for which petitioner has
paid into this court the sum of $__________.
3. That respondents are entitled to interest at the rate of two percent (2%) above prime on the
amount of $_______, that being the difference between the $_______, deposited as tender and the Jury of
View award, from the date of taking, [insert the date of taking], until the sum is paid into court.
4. That the members of the Jury of View be paid the sum of $_______ each for their services in this
cause, the total sum to be paid to the clerk of this court by petitioner as part of the costs in this cause and
that the clerk shall distribute the sum to the members of the jury.
5. That this cause be referred to the clerk for a determination of the taxes that constitute a lien on
the property in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 26-5-108(b).
This the ______ day of _____________, 20___.
							
_________________________
							
Circuit Court Judge
Approved for Entry
________________________Attorney for Petitioner
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Form 11
APPEAL FROM FINDING OF THE JURY OF VIEW
Petitioner, _________________, excepts to the finding and report of the Jury of View that the fair cash
value of the property rights condemned is $___________, and appeals this finding and requests a trial before
a petit jury in the usual way, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-16-118.

				
				

By _______________________
Attorney for Petitioner

I am surety for costs not to exceed $__________________
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By _______________________
Attorney for Petitioner
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Form 12
NOTICE OF DISMISSAL
Comes to the petitioner, pursuant to Rule 41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and files this
notice of voluntary dismissal as to the Respondent ________________.

					

Respectfully submitted,

					
					

___________________________
Attorney for Petitioner
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Form 13
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Petitioner, _________, having given notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41 of the
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure against Respondent _________________.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this case is DISMISSED as against the
respondent, _______________, and that the moneys deposited into court shall be refunded to petitioner,
minus the court costs.
Entered this ______ day of _____________, 20___.

					
					

_______________________
Circuit Court Judge

APPROVED FOR ENTRY

_______________________________
Attorney for Petitioner
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Form 14
AGREED FINAL ORDER
This cause having been compromised and settled, as evidenced by the signatures of counsel for
petitioner and the signatures of the respondents, and the court being duly and sufficiently advised;
It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED by the court that the respondents have and recover the sum
of $_______ the same being the fair cash market value of the property described below, petitioner having
paid into court $_________ at the time of filing the Petition for Condemnation.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED by the court that all of the title to the property
described below be divested out of respondents and all other persons claiming any adverse interest in it and
is vested in petitioner ____________ in fee simple, the property being more particularly described as follows:
[description of the property]
It further appearing to the court that this property may be subject to lien for taxes due, interest and
penalty, if any, owing to ___________________ (county and/or municipality in which property located) and
in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 26-5-108(b), the clerk of the court, prior to the payment of
any part of the judgment to respondents, shall ascertain whether there are any taxes due and unpaid that are
lien upon the property, and shall issue to each of the officials charged with the collection of any taxes that
might be a lien on the property a statement, giving the style and number of this cause, a description of the
property, and the name of the party out of whom title is divested; whereupon each of these officials shall
certify to the clerk an itemized statement of taxes, interest and penalty, if any, that were a lien upon the land
as of the date of entry of this Agreed Final Order.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the clerk is directed to pay out of the money
deposited by the petitioner any unpaid taxes that may be determined to be owing by the above references,
and the clerk shall pay any remaining funds to the respondents.
It is further ORDERED by the court that the costs in this cause be taxed against the petitioner for
which execution may issue if necessary.
The clerk of this court will make out and certify to the petitioner, ______________, a copy of
this judgment together with a cost bill for the lawful costs of this cause, for payment by the Petitioner
_____________.

Entered this ______ day of _____________, 20___.

EMINENT DOMAIN IN TENNESSEE • Municipal Technical Advisory Service

51

						
						

_______________________
Circuit Court Judge

Approved for Entry

_______________________
Attorney for Petitioner

________________________
Attorney for Respondents
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PRE-TRIAL CHECK LIST
Open office file.

Pre-hearing, check on service of process.

Make sure procedures required under Relocation Act
have been complied with.

Hearing to obtain order of condemnation and
appropriation.

Bring title information up to date.

Signing and entry of order of condemnation
and appropriation.

Check to see which civil district property is located.
Check whether taxes due require naming taxing
authority as party defendant.
Check whether tenants must be named as
parties defendant.
Obtain aerial photograph of subject property.
Obtain planning commission plat of subject
property.

Furnish copy of order of condemnation and
appropriation to adversary counsel.
Pre-trial conference at site of property with
appraiser; obtain photographs of subject property,
immediately surrounding property, and comparable
sales; locate comparable sales on planning
commission map.
Request copies of adversary appraisals.
Summarize for trial use all appraisals.

Obtain engineer’s drawing showing area of taking.
Arrange for appraisal.
Establish tentative date of taking and arrange with
appraisers and photographer for pre-trial conference
at site of property on date of taking.

Explore settlement possibilities with
adversary counsel.
Take any necessary depositions and file them
with clerk.

Obtain project description for use in petition.

Prepare pre-trial brief as required or desired and
requests for special instructions.

Draft petition.

Prepare all exhibits for use at trial.

Draft notice and, if necessary, order of publication
and supporting affidavit.

Pre-trial conference with engineering witness,
if any.

Draft order of condemnation and appropriation.

Pre-trial conference with judge and
adversary counsel.

Proofread all pleadings.
File petition, make deposit, and arrange for service.
Obtain deposit receipt.
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POST-TRIAL CHECK LIST
Draft final judgment.
Proofread final judgment.
Submit draft final judgment for description check.
Obtain signatures to final judgment and see
to entry.
Obtain statements from appraisers, court reporters,
suppliers of exhibits, and photographers.
Approve statements and submit for payment.
Obtain, review, and approve bill of costs.
Obtain instructions regarding appeal.
Obtain certified copy of final judgment.
Obtain parcel number for final judgment.
See to registration for final judgment.
Advance cost of registration of final judgment and
obtain receipt.
Forward certified copy of final judgment to
appropriate official.
Pay judgment and obtain receipt.
Pay costs and obtain receipt.
Prepare statement for services.
Close office file.
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Eminent Domain Notes
CHAPTER 1
1 City of Maryville v. Edmondson, 931 S.W.2d 932 (Tenn. App. 1996); Harper v. Trenton Housing Authority,
274 S.W.2d 635 (Tenn. App. 1954); City of Knoxville v. Heth, 186 Tenn. 321, 210 S.W.2d 326 (1948).
2

See Chapter Three on Public Use.

3

Edwards v. Hallsdale-Powell Utility District, 115 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2003); Rivergate Wine and Liquors, Inc.
v. City of Goodlettsville, 647 S.W.2d 631 (Tenn. 1983); Southern Railway Co. v. City of Memphis, 126 Tenn.
267, 148 S.W. 662 (1912); Allen v. Farnsworth, 13 Tenn. 189 (1833); County Highway Commission of Rutherford
County v. Smith, 61 Tenn. App. 292, 454 S.W. 2d 124 (1969). See Chapter Four on Just Compensation.

4

Trustees of New Pulaski Cemetery v. Ballentine, 151 Tenn. 622, 271 S.W. 38 (1924); County Highway
Commission of Rutherford County v. Smith, supra.

5

State ex rel. v. Oliver, 162 Tenn. 100, 35 S.W.2d 396 (1931); Anderson v. Turberville, 46 Tenn. 150 (1868).

6

Claiborne County v. Jennings, 199 Tenn. 161, 285 S.W.2d 132 (1955); Knox County v. Kennedy, 92 Tenn. 1,
20 S.W. 311 (1892); Shelby County v. Armour, 495 S.W.2d 816 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971).

7

Rivergate Wine and Liquors Inc. v. City of Goodlettsville, supra; Duck River Electric Membership Corp. v. City
of Manchester, 529 S.W. 2d 202 (Tenn. 1975); City of Knoxville v. Heth, supra; Zirkle v. City of Kingston,
217 Tenn. 210, 396 S.W.2d 356 (1965); City of Memphis v. Wright, 14 Tenn. 497 (1834).

8

Provided that these improvements will be put to a public use. Webb v. Knox County Transmission Co.,
143 Tenn. 423, 225 S.W. 1046 (1920); Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Co. v. Paint Rock Flume &
Transportation Co., 128 Tenn. 277, 160 S.W. 522 (1913); Alfred Phosphate Co. v. Duck River Phosphate Co.,
120 Tenn. 260, 113 S.W. 410 (1907); Ryan v. Louisville & Nashville Terminal Co., 102 Tenn. 111,
50 S.W. 744 (1899).

9

Instances where the power of eminent domain was delegated by private act of the General Assembly
are not included.

10

American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Proffitt, 903 S.W.2d 309 (Tenn. App. 1995); Claiborne County
v. Jennings, supra; Clouse v. Garfinkle, 190 Tenn. 677, 231 S.W.2d 345 (1950); Vinson v. Nashville, Chattanooga
& St. Louis Railway, 45 Tenn. App. 161, 321 S.W.2d 841 (1958); Rogers v. City of Knoxville, 40 Tenn.
App. 170. 289 S.W.2d 868 (1955).

11

Alcoa Development and Housing Authority v. Monday, Docket No 196; 1991 W L 12291. (Tenn. App. 1991).

12

Clouse v. Garfinkle, supra; Tennessee Power Co. v. Rust, 8 Tenn. Civ. App. 368 (1918).
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13

City of Clarksville v. Moore, 688 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1985); Nashville Housing Authority v. City of Nashville,
192 Tenn. 103, 237 S.W.2d 946 (1951); Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Moriarity, 135 Tenn. 446,
186 S.W. 1053 (1916); Sackman and Rohan, 1 Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain, § 1.42 (3d Ed. 1992).

14

City of Clarksville v. Moore, supra; Draper v. Haynes, 567 S.W. 2d 462 (Tenn. 1978); City of Memphis v. Hood,
208 Tenn. 319, 345 S.W.2d 887 (1961); Ambrose v. City of Knoxville, 728 S.W.2d 338 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986);
Sackman and Rohan, 1 Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain, § 1.42 [3] (3d. Ed. 1992).

15

City of Clarksville v. Moore, supra.

16

Draper v. Haynes, supra.

17

In re Billing and Collection Tariffs of South Central Bell, 779 S.W.2d 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).

18

City of Memphis v. Hood, supra; Ambrose v. City of Knoxville, supra.

19

Ledbetter v. Beach, 220 Tenn. 623, 421 S.W.2d 814 (1967); Hadden v. City of Gatlinburg, Docket No. 97
(Tenn. Ct. App. W.S. at Knoxville, August 28, 1985).

20

Hudgins v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, 885 S.W.2d 74 (Tenn. App. 1994).

21

Griffith and Stokes, Eminent Domain in Tennessee, p.2 (Rev. Ed. July 1979).

22

260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922).

23

Bayside Warehouse Co. v. City of Memphis, 63 Tenn. App. 268, 470 S.W. 2d 375 (1971).

24

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S. Ct. 2378,
96 L. Ed.2d 250 (1987).

25

Edwards v. Hallsdale-Powell Utility District, 115 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2003).

CHAPTER 2
1 For example, special procedures have been provided for the acquisition of property for certain municipal
projects (7-31-107 et seq.), for municipal housing authorities (29-17-401 et seq.), for the opening, changing or
closing of county roads (54-10-201 et seq.) and for municipal or county schools (49-6-2001 et seq.).
2

56

Williams v. McMinn County, 209 Tenn. 236, 352 S.W. 2d 430 (1961); Ragland v. Davidson County Board
of Education, 203 Tenn. 317, 312 S.W.2d 855 (1958); City of Knoxville v. Heth, 186 Tenn. 321,
210 S.W.2d 326 (1948); Town of Cookeville v. Farley, 171 Tenn. 260, 102 S.W.2d 56 (1937); Derryberry v. Beck,
153 Tenn. 220, 280 S.W. 1014 (1925); City of Chattanooga v. State, 151 Tenn. 691, 272 S.W. 432 (1924);
Department of Highways and Public Works v. Gamble, 18 Tenn. App. 95, 73 S.W.2d 175 (1934). But see Baker
v. Nashville Housing Authority, 219 Tenn. 201, 408 S.W.2d 651 (1966) (municipal housing authority may
not utilize "bulldozer/quick take" procedure).
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3

The right to take is discussed in detail in Chapter Three.

4

Just compensation is discussed in detail in Chapter Four.

5

Cox v. State, 217 Tenn. 644, 399 S.W.2d 776 (1965); Hombra v. Smith, 159 Tenn. 308,
17 S.W.2d 921 (1929); Scruggs v. Town of Sweetwater, 29 Tenn. App. 357, 196 S.W.2d 717 (1946).

6

E.R. & R.I. Dixon v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 115 Tenn. 362, 89 S.W. 322 (1905).

7

City of Maryville v. Waters, 207 Tenn. 213, 338 S.W.2d. 608 (1907).

8

H.J.L., L.P. v. Nashville & Eastern R.R. Corp., 1999 WL 499 744 (Tenn. App. 1999); Knox County v. Moncier,
224 Tenn. 361, 455 S.W.2d. 153 (1970); Evans v. Wheeler, 209 Tenn. 40, 348 S.W.2d 500 (1961); Chambers
v. Chattanooga Union Railway Co., 130 Tenn. 459, 171 S.W. 84 (1914); McLain v. State, 59 Tenn. App. 529,
442 S.W.2d 637 (1968).

9

Knox County v. Moncier, supra; Evans v. Wheeler, supra.

10

Chambers v. Chattanooga Union Railroad Co., supra.

11

McLain v. State, supra.

12

Sanford v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 225 Tenn. 350, 469 S.W.2d 363 (1971).

13

Brady v. Correll, 20 Tenn. App. 224, 97 S.W.2d 448 (1936).

14

Colcough v. Nashville and Northwestern Railroad Co., 39 Tenn. 171 (1858).

15

Union Railway Co. v. Hunton, 114 Tenn. 609, 88 S.W. 182 (1905); Lamar Advertising of Tennessee, Inc.
v. Metropolitan Development and Housing Authority, 803 S.W.2d 686 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); City of Morristown
v. Sauls, 61 Tenn. App. 666, 457 S.W.2d 601 (1969).

16

State v. Holland, 51 Tenn. App. 344, 367 S.W.2d 791 (1962).

17

Cheatham v. Carter County, Tennessee, 363 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1966).

18

Middle Tennessee Electric Membership Corp. v. Batey, Docket No. 89-233-II (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S.
January 31, 1990).

19

Noell v. Tennessee Eastern Power Co., 130 Tenn. 245, 169 S.W. 1169 (1914); Griffith and Stokes, Eminent
Domain in Tennessee, p. 22 (Rev. Ed. July 1979).

20

State ex rel. Shaw v. Shofner, 573 S.W.2d 169 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).

21

Clinton Livestock Auction Co. v. City of Knoxville, 52 Tenn. App. 614, 376 S.W.2d 743 (1963).
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22

State ex rel. Smith v. Overstreet, 533 S.W.2d 283 (1976).

23

Smith County v. Eatherly, 820 S.W.2d 366 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

24

Kennedy v. City of Chattanooga, 56 Tenn. App. 198, 405 S.W.2d 653 (1966); Clinton Livestock Auction Co.
v. City of Knoxville, supra.

25

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not permit
service by publication where the defendant's name is known or is very easily ascertainable. Love v. First
National Bank of Clarksville, 646 S.W.2d 163 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).

26

Baggett v. Baggett, 541 S.W.2d 407 (Tenn. 1976).

27

Griffith and Stokes, supra, at p. 23.

28

Johnson v. Roane County, 212 Tenn. 433, 370 S.W.2d 496 (1963).

29

Wilkerson, The Institution and Prosecution of Condemnation Proceedings, 26 Tenn. L. Rev. 325 (1959);
Griffith and Stokes, supra, at p. 23.

30

Wilkerson, supra, at p. 328.

31

The right to take is considered in detail in Chapter Three.

32

Tennessee Central Railroad Co. v. Campbell, 109 Tenn. 655, 73 S.W. 112 (1903); Camp v. Coal Creek & Winter's
Gap Railroad Co., 79 Tenn. 705 (1883).

33

As an alternative, the parties may agree on the persons who will serve on the jury of view, or the judge will
select the jurors and the names of these jurors will be specified in the order directing the writ of inquiry
(T.C.A. 29-16-109). The sheriff will thereafter serve the writ of inquiry on the agreed-upon jurors.

34

Wilkerson, supra, at p. 328.

35

Although the statute does not require notice to be given to parties or agents who are not residents of the
county, such notice would be required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Bryant v. Edwards, 707 S.W.2d 868 (Tenn. 1986).

36

Wilkerson, supra, at p. 328.

37

As an alternative, the presentation of testimony may occur at a different location after the jury of view has
had an opportunity to inspect the property.

38

Mississippi Railway Co. v. McDonald, 59 Tenn. 54 (1873).
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39

The attorney for condemners normally prepares the report leaving a blank for the jury of view to fill
in the amount of the award. Wilkerson, supra, at p. 329.

40

Wilkerson, supra, at p. 330.

41

Wilkerson, supra, at p. 330.

42

Wilkerson, supra, at p. 330.

43

Wilkerson, supra, at p. 330.

44

Wilkerson, supra, at p. 330.

45

Officer v. East Tennessee Natural Gas Co., 192 Tenn. 184, 239 S.W.2d 999 (1951); Pound v. Fowler,
175 Tenn. 220, 133 S.W.2d 486 (1939).

46

Pound v. Fowler, supra; Overton County Railroad Co. v. Eldridge, 118 Tenn. 79, 98 S.W. 1051 (1906).

47

Pound v. Fowler, supra.

48

Pound v. Fowler, supra.

49

Baker v. Rose, 165 Tenn. 543, 56 S.W.2d 732 (1932).

50

State ex rel. v. Oliver, 167 Tenn. 155, 67 S.W.2d 146 (1933).

51

See Chapter Three on the effect of such possession on the finality of the court's determination of the
condemner's right to take the property.

52

Counties (and arguably municipalities) are not required to post this bond to obtain possession pending
appeal. Claiborne County v. Jennings, 199 Tenn. 161, 285 S.W.2d 132 (1955).

53

Montgomery County v. Nichols, 10 S.W.3d 258 (Tenn. App. 1999); Anderson v. Smith, 521 S.W.2d 787
(Tenn. 1975); Cunningham v. Memphis Railroad Terminal Co., 126 Tenn. 343, 149 S.W. 103 (1912);
Williams v. McMinn County, supra.

54

Anderson v. Smith, supra; Cunningham v. Memphis Railroad Terminal Co., supra; Department of Highways
and Public Works v. Gamble, 18 Tenn. App. 95, 73 S.W.2d 175 (1934).

55

Baker v. Nashville Housing Authority, supra.

56

Catlett v. State, 207 Tenn. 1, 336 S.W.2d 8 (1960).

57

Kennedy v. City of Chattanooga, supra.
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59

58

This option is not available to defendants if the state is the condemner. State, Department of Highways
v. Thornton, 57 Tenn. App. 127, 415 S.W.2d 884 (1967).

59

If the right to take is challenged, the condemner has no right to possession until that issue is resolved.
Shelby County v. Armour, 495 S.W.2d 816 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975). See Chapter Three on the right to take.

60

In some counties, the court may require the condemner and property owners to appear on a date certain
after the expiration of the 30-day period to obtain an order awarding possession to the condemner.

61

State ex rel. Moulton v. Burkhart, 212 Tenn. 352, 370 S.W.2d 411 (1963).

62

The specification of the amount of damages the condemner believes the property owner is entitled
to is not an admission, Kennedy v. City of Chattanooga, supra, and is not relevant at trial. Smith County
v. Eatherly, supra.

63

State ex rel. Smith v. Overstreet, supra.

63A

Smith County v. Eatherly, 820 S.W.2d 366 (Tenn. App. 1991).

64

State ex rel. Moulton v. Burkhart, supra.

65

If the parties do not demand a jury under Rule 38.02 or file a motion for a jury trial under
Rule 39.02, the court may not impanel a jury on its own motion. Smith v. Williams, 575 S.W.2d 503
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).

66

State ex rel. Moulton v. Burkhart, supra; West Wilson Utility District v. Ligon, 768 S.W.2d 681
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

67

Anderson v. Smith, supra.

68

Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Denson, Docket No. 01-A-01-9005-CV-00174,
1990 WL 154646 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S. October 17, 1990), app. denied (January 28, 1991).

CHAPTER 3
1 Town of Collierville v. Norfolk & Southern Railway, 1 S.W.3d 68 (Tenn. App. 1998); Harper v. Trenton
Housing Authority, 197 Tenn. 257, 271 S.W.2d 185 (1954); City of Nashville v. Dad's Auto Accessories,
154 Tenn. 194, 285 S.W. 52 (1926); Tennessee Central Railroad Co. v. Campbell, 109 Tenn. 640,
75 S.W. 1012 (1902); Shelby County v. Armour, 495 S.W.2d 816 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971); Morgan
County v. Jones, 12 Tenn. App. 197 (1930).
2
2A

60

Hawkins County v. Mallory, Docket No. 91 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S. January 17, 1985).
City of Johnson City v. Campbell, 2001 WL 112311 (Tenn. App. 2001).
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3

Wilkerson, The Institution and Prosecution of Condemnation Proceedings, 26 Tenn. L. Rev. 325 (1959).

4

Wilkerson, supra, at p. 326.

5

Brumley v. Town of Greeneville, 38 Tenn. App. 322, 274 S.W.2d 12 (1954).

6

Alcoa Development and Housing Authority v. Monday, Docket No. 196; 1991 WL 12291 (Tenn. Ct. App.
E.S. February 7, 1991).

7

Wilkerson, supra, at p. 326.

8

Johnson City v. Cloninger, 213 Tenn. 71, 372 S.W.2d 281 (1963); City of Knoxville v. Heth, 186 Tenn. 321,
210 S.W.2d 326 (1948); Sackman and Rohan, 2A Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain, § 7.02
(Rev. 3d Ed. 1990).

9

City of Knoxville v. Heth, supra; Knoxville Housing Authority v. City of Knoxville, 174 Tenn. 76,
123 S.W.2d 1085 (1939); Ryan v. Louisville & Nashville Terminal Co., 102 Tenn. 111, 50 S.W. 744 (1899).

10

Duck River Electric Membership Corp. v. City of Manchester, 529 S.W.2d 202 (Tenn. 1975); Justus v. McMahan,
189 Tenn. 470, 226 S.W.2d 84 (1949); City of Knoxville v. Heth, supra; Department of Highways v. Stepp,
150 Tenn. 682, 226 S.W. 776 (1924); Southern Railway Co. v. City of Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267,
148 S.W. 662 (1912); Anderson v. Turberville, 46 Tenn. 150 (1868); County Highway Commission of Rutherford
County v. Smith, 61 Tenn. App. 292, 454 S.W.2d 124 (1969).

11

City of Knoxville v. Heth, supra; Stroud v. State, 38 Tenn. App. 654, 279 S.W.2d 82 (1955).

12

City of Knoxville v. Heth, supra; Ryan v. Louisville & Nashville Terminal Co., supra.

13

Trustees of New Pulaski Cemetery v. Ballentine, 151 Tenn. 622, 271 S.W. 38 (1924); Alfred Phosphate Co.
v. Duck River Phosphate Co., 120 Tenn. 260, 113 S.W. 410 (1907).

14

Sackman and Rohan, supra, at § 7.02.

15

Alfred Phosphate Co. v. Duck River Phosphate Co., supra; Memphis Freight Co. v. Mayor & Aldermen of Memphis,
44 Tenn. 419 (1867).

16

City of Knoxville v. Heth, supra; Knoxville Housing Authority v. City of Knoxville, supra; Knoxville's Community
Development Corp. v. Wright, 600 S.W. 2d 745 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

17

Webb v. Knox County Transmission Co., 143 Tenn. 423, 225 S.W.1046 (1920); Middle Tennessee Electric
Membership Corp. v. Batey, Docket No. 89-233-II (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S. January 31, 1990).

18

Middle Tennessee Electric Membership Corp. v. Batey, supra.
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18A

Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).

19

Johnson City v. Cloninger, supra. See also Sackman and Rohan, supra, at § 7.18.

20

Johnson City v. Cloninger, supra; City of Knoxville v. Heth, supra; Knoxville Housing Authority v. City of Knoxville,
supra; Knoxville's Community Development Corp. v. Wright, supra.

21

Johnson City v. Cloninger, supra.

22

Knoxville's Community Development Corp. v. Wright, supra.

23

Webb v. Knox County Transmission Co., supra; Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Paint Rock Flume
& Transportation Co., 128 Tenn. 277, 160 S.W. 522 (1913); Sackman and Rohan, supra, at § 7.18 [2].

24

Ryan v. Louisville & Nashville Terminal Co., supra.

25

Derryberry v. Beck, 153 Tenn. 220, 280 S.W. 1014 (1925); Bashor v. Bowman, 133 Tenn. 269,
180 S.W. 326 (1915) (where a landlocked property owner condemned an access road to a public road).

26

Memphis Freight Co. v. Mayor & Aldermen of Memphis, supra.

27

City of Chattanooga v. State, 151 Tenn. 691, 272 S.W. 432 (1925); Town of Clarksville v. Fairley,
171 Tenn. 260, 102 S.W.2d 56 (1937).

28

Johnson v. City of Chattanooga, 183 Tenn. 123, 191 S.W.2d 175 (1945).

29

Knox County v. Kennedy, 92 Tenn. 1, 20 S.W. 311 (1892).

30

Woodard v. City of Nashville, 108 Tenn. 353, 67 S.W. 801 (1902).

31

Zirkle v. City of Kingston, 217 Tenn. 210, 396 S.W.2d 356 (1965).

32

City of Knoxville v. Heth, supra.

33

Beadle v. Town of Crossville, 157 Tenn. 249, 7 S.W.2d 992 (1927).

34 Town of Pulaski v. Ballentine, 153 Tenn. 393, 284 S.W. 370 (1925).

62

35

Johnson City v. Cloninger, supra.

36

Shelby County v. Armour, supra.

37

Shelby County v. Armour, supra.
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38

Nashville Housing Authority v. City of Nashville, 192 Tenn. 103, 237 S.W.2d 946 (1950); Knoxville Housing
Authority v. City of Knoxville, supra.

39

Knoxville's Community Development Corp. v. Wright, supra.

40

Town of Collierville v. Norfolk & Southern Railway, 1 S.W.3d 68 (Tenn. App. 1998).

40A

Pickler v. Parr, 138 S.W. 3d 210 (Tenn. App. 2003).

41

Collier v. Union Railway Co., 113 Tenn. 96, 83 S.W. 155 (1904); Ryan v. Louisville & Nashville
Terminal Co., supra.

42

American Telephone & Telegraph v. Proffitt, 903 S.W.2d 309 (Tenn. App. 1995); Doty v. American Telephone
& Telegraph Co., 123 Tenn. 329, 130 S.W. 1053 (1910).

43

Harding v. Goodlett, 11 Tenn. 41 (1832).

44

Tipton v. Miller, 11 Tenn. 423 (1832).

45

Webb v. Knox County Transmission Co., supra; Great Falls Power Co. v. Webb, 123 Tenn. 584,
133 S.W. 1105 (1910).

46

Hadley v. Harpeth Turnpike Co., 21 Tenn. 555 (1841).

47

Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Paint Rock Flume & Transportation Co., supra.

48

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co., 133 Tenn. 691,
182 S.W. 254 (1915); Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 101 Tenn. 62,
46 S.W. 371 (1898).

49

Shinkle v. Nashville Improvement Co., 172 Tenn. 555, 113 S.W.2d 404 (1938).

50

Brannan v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 210 Tenn. 697, 362 S.W.2d 236 (1962).

51

Southern Railway Co. v. City of Memphis, supra; Memphis State Line Railroad Co. v. Forest Hill Cemetery Co.,
116 Tenn. 400, 94 S.W.69 (1906).

52

Town of Dandridge v. Patterson, 827 S.W.2d 797 (Tenn. App. 1991); Duck River Electric Membership Corp.
v. City of Manchester, supra; Williamson County v. Franklin & Spring Hill Turnpike Co., 143 Tenn. 628,
228 S.W. 714 (1920); Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Mayor and Aldermen of Union City, 137 Tenn. 491,
194 S.W. 572 (1917).

53

Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Denson, Docket No. 01-A-01-9005-CV-00174
(Tenn. Ct. App. M.S. October 17, 1990), app. denied, (January 28, 1991).
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54

First Utility District of Knox County v. Jarnigan-Bodden, 40 S.W.3d 60 (Tenn. App. 2000); City of Maryville
v. Edmondson, 931 S.W.2d 932 (Tenn. App. 1996); Duck River Electric Membership Corp. v. City of Manchester,
supra; Justus v. McMahan, supra; City of Knoxville v. Heth, supra; Department of Highways v. Stepp, supra;
Southern Railway Co. v. City of Memphis, supra; Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
v. Huntington Park Associates, Docket No. 88-144-II (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S. October 26, 1988), app. denied
(March 9, 1989); County Highway Commission of Rutherford County v. Smith, supra; Harper v. Trenton Housing
Authority, 38 Tenn. App. 396, 274 S.W.2d 635 (1954).

55

Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Denson, supra; Metropolitan Government of
Nashville and Davidson County v. Huntington Park Associates, supra.

56

Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Huntington Park Associates, supra; Harper
v. Trenton Housing Authority, supra.

57

Justus v. McMahan, supra.

58

Pickler v. Parr, 138 S.W. 3d 210 (Tenn. App. 2003); City of Knoxville v. Heth, supra; Department of Highways
v. Stepp, supra; Southern Railway Co. v. City of Memphis, supra; Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson County v. Huntington Park Associates, supra; Harper v. Trenton Housing Authority, supra.

59

Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 67 L. Ed. 1186 (1922); United States
ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Dugger, 89 F. Supp. 877 (E.D. Tenn. 1948); Commonwealth, Department
of Highways v. Burchett, 367 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963). See also Sackman and Rohan 1A Nichols'
The Law of Eminent Domain, § 4.11 [2] (Rev. 3d Ed. 1990).

60

Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, supra.

61

City of Knoxville v. Heth, supra.

62

Harper v. Trenton Housing Authority, supra; Lebanon and Nashville Turnpike Co. v. Creveling, 159 Tenn. 147,
17 S.W.2d 22 (1929); City of Nashville v. Dad's Auto Accessories, Inc., supra; Department of Highways v. Stepp,
supra; Cunningham v. Memphis Railroad Terminal Co., 126 Tenn. 343, 149 S.W. 103 (1912); Tennessee Central
Railroad Co. v. Campbell, 109 Tenn. 655, 73 S.W. 112 (1902) (Campbell II); Shelby County v. Armour, supra;
Morgan County v. Jones, supra.

63

Alloway v. City of Nashville, 88 Tenn. 510, 13 S.W. 123 (1890); Morgan County v. Jones, supra.

64

Department of Highways v. Stepp, supra; Tennessee Central Railroad Co. v. Campbell, supra (Campbell II).

65

Georgia Industrial Realty Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 163 Tenn. 435, 43 S.W.2d 490 (1931); Cunningham
v. Memphis Railroad Terminal Co., supra; Tennessee Central Railroad Co. v. Campbell, supra (Campbell I).

66

Tennessee Central Railroad Co. v. Campbell, supra (Campbell I).
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CHAPTER 4
1 Tennessee Constitution, Article 1, Section 21.
2

Southern Railway Co. v. City of Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267, 148 S.W. 662 (1912); Paducah and Memphis Railroad
Co. v. Stovall, 59 Tenn. 1 (1873); City of Memphis v. Bolton, 56 Tenn. 508 (1872); Woodfolk v. Nashville
& Chattanooga Railroad Co., 32 Tenn. 422 (1852).

3

Sevier County v. Waters, 126 S.W. 3d 913 (Tenn. App. 2003); Nashville Housing Authority v. Cohen,
541 S.W.2d 947 (Tenn. 1976); Alloway v. City of Nashville, 88 Tenn. 510, 13 S.W. 123 (1890).

4

State ex rel. Shaw v. Gorman, 596 S.W.2d 796 (Tenn. 1980); Nashville Housing Authority v. Cohen, supra;
Davidson County Board of Education v. First American National Bank, 202 Tenn. 9, 301 S.W.2d 905 (1957);
Lewisburg & Northern Railroad Co. v. Hinds, 134 Tenn. 293, 183 S.W. 985 (1915); Southern Railway Co.
v. City of Memphis, supra; Alloway v. City of Nashville, supra; Shelby County v. Mid-South Title Co.,
615 S.W.2d 677 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); Memphis Housing Authority v. Mid-South Title Co.,
59 Tenn. App. 654, 443 S.W.2d 492 (1968); Brookside Mills, Inc. v. Moulton, 55 Tenn. App. 643,
404 S.W.2d 258 (1965).

5

Strasser v. City of Nashville, 207 Tenn. 24, 336 S.W.2d 16 (1960); Davidson County Board of Education
v. First American National Bank, supra; State ex rel. Pack v. Hill, 56 Tenn. App. 410, 408 S.W.2d 213 (1965).

6

City of Lafayette v. Hammock, 1999 WL 346217 (Tenn. App. 1999); Shook & Fletcher Supply Co. v. City
of Nashville, 47 Tenn. App. 339, 338 S.W.2d 237 (1960).

7

Catlett v. State, 207 Tenn. 1, 336 S.W.2d 8 (1960); Town of Erin v. Brooks, 190 Tenn. 407,
230 S.W.2d 397 (1950); Lebanon and Nashville Turnpike Co. v. Creveling, 159 Tenn. 147,
17 S.W.2d 22 (1929); Memphis Housing Authority v. Ryan, 54 Tenn. App. 557, 393 S.W.2d 3 (1964);
Morgan County v. Jones, 12 Tenn. App. 197 (1930); City of Lebanon v. Merryman, Docket
No. 01-A-01-9005-CV-00157 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S. November 16, 1990). See also T.C.A. § 29-16-118
on the right to open and close the argument before the court and jury.

8

Love v. Smith, 566 S.W.2d 816 (Tenn. 1978); Nashville Housing Authority v. Cohen, supra; State v. Rascoe,
181 Tenn. 43, 178 S.W.2d 392 (1944); Southern Railway Co. v. Michaels, 126 Tenn. 702, 151 S.W. 53 (1912);
State ex rel. Department of Transportation Bureau of Highways v. Brevard, 545 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1976); Memphis Housing Authority v. Mid-South Title Co., supra; State v. Chumbley, 27 Tenn. App. 377,
181 S.W.2d 382 (1944).

9

Layne v. Speight, 529 S.W.2d 209 (Tenn. 1975); State, Department of Highways v. Urban Estates, Inc.,
225 Tenn. 193, 465 S.W.2d 357 (1971); City of Memphis v. Bolton, supra; Woodfolk v. Nashville & Chattanooga
Railroad Co., supra; State ex rel. Commissioner, Department of Transportation v. Veglio, 786 S.W.2d 944 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1989); State ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Harvey, 680 S.W.2d 792 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983);
Memphis Housing Authority v. Newton, 484 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972); State, Department of Highways
v. Jennings, 58 Tenn. App. 594, 435 S.W.2d 481 (1968).
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10

Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County v. Overnite Transportation Co., 919 S.W.2d 598
(Tenn. App. 1995); Layne v. Speight, supra; State ex rel. Commissioner, Department of Transportation v. Veglio,
supra; State v. Hodges, 552 S.W.2d 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).

11

Layne v. Speight, supra; State ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Harvey, supra; State v. Hodges, supra.

12

Metro. Govt. of Nashville & Davidson Co. v. Overnite Transportation Co., supra; Layne v. Speight, supra.

13

Metro. Govt. of Nashville & Davidson Co. v. Overnite Transportation Co., supra; State v. Hodges, supra.

14

Layne v. Speight, supra; State ex rel. Commissioner, Department of Transportation v. Veglio, supra.

15

Vaulx v. Tennessee Central Railroad Co., 120 Tenn. 316, 108 S.W. 1142 (1907); Board of Mayor and Aldermen,
Town of Milan v. Thomas, 27 Tenn. App. 166, 178 S.W.2d 772 (1943).

15A
16
16A

City of Pigeon Forge v. Loveday, 2003 WL 358704 (Tenn. App. 2003).
Lewisburg & Northern Railroad Co. v. Hinds, supra.
State v. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d 224 (Tenn. App. 1994).

17

Love v. Smith, supra; Nashville Housing Authority v. Cohen, supra; Davidson County Board of Education v. First
American National Bank, supra; McKinney v. City of Nashville, 102 Tenn. 131, 52 S.W. 781 (1899); Alloway
v. City of Nashville, supra; State ex rel. Commissioner, Department of Transportation v. Headrick, 667 S.W.2d 70
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Parkes, 557 S.W.2d 504 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977); State ex rel. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Highways v. Brevard, supra; Memphis Housing Authority v. Mid-South Title Co., supra;
Stroud v. State, 38 Tenn. App. 654, 279 S.W.2d 82 (1955).

18

Nashville Housing Authority v. Cohen, supra; State ex rel. Commissioner, Department of Transportation v. Veglio,
supra; Shelby County v. Mid-South Title Co., supra.

18A

State ex rel. Commissioner of DOT v. Williams, 828 S.W.2d 397 (Tenn. App. 1991); State ex rel. Commissioner
of DOT v. Cox, 840 S.W.2d 357 (Tenn. App. 1991).

19

State ex rel. Commissioner, Department of Transportation v. Veglio, supra; Burchfield v. State, 774 S.W.2d 178
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Parkes , supra.

20

Southern Railway Co. v. City of Memphis, supra.

21

Union Railway Co. v. Hunton, 114 Tenn. 609, 88 S.W. 182 (1905); McKinney v. City of Nashville, supra;
State v. Parkes, supra; State, Department of Highways and Public Works v. Texaco Inc., 49 Tenn. App. 278, 354
S.W.2d 792 (1961).

22

Shelby County v. Barden, 527 S.W.2d 124 (Tenn. 1974); Lebanon and Nashville Turnpike Co. v. Creveling, supra.
See also County of Greene v. Cooper, Docket No. 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S. February 12, 1990).
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23

State ex rel. Commissioner of DOT v. Cox, 840 S.W.2d 357 (Tenn. App. 1991); Love v. Smith, supra; State
v. Parkes, supra; State ex rel. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Highways v. Brevard, supra; Stroud
v. State, supra.

24

Layne v. Speight, supra; Davidson County Board of Education v. First American National Bank, supra;
Alloway v. City of Nashville, supra; Memphis Housing Authority v. Mid-South Title Co., supra.

25

City of Cookeville, Tennessee v. Stiles, 1995 WL 571851 (Tenn. App. 1995); Davidson County Board of Education
v. First American National Bank, supra; Memphis Housing Authority v. Mid-South Title Co., supra.

26

Davidson County Board of Education v. First American National Bank, supra; Memphis Housing Authority
v. Mid-South Title Co., supra.

27

State ex rel. Smith v. Livingston Limestone Co., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 942 (Tenn. 1977).

28

Evans v. Wheeler, 209 Tenn. 40, 348 S.W.2d 500 (1961); Lebanon and Nashville Turnpike Co. v. Creveling,
supra; Southern Railway Co. v. City of Memphis, supra.

29

Lebanon and Nashville Turnpike Co. v. Creveling, supra; Southern Railway Co. v. City of Memphis, supra;
State ex rel. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Highways v. Brevard, supra; County of Greene
v. Cooper, supra.

30

Memphis Housing Authority v. Peabody Garage Co., 505 S.W.2d 719 (Tenn. 1974); Lewisburg & Northern
Railroad Co. v. Hinds, supra; Union Railway Co. v. Hunton, supra; Memphis Housing Authority v. Newton, supra;
Edgington v. Kansas City, Memphis & Birmingham Railroad Co., 10 Tenn. App. 685 (1929).

31

Layne v. Speight, supra; Memphis Housing Authority v. Peabody Garage Co., supra; Lewisburg & Northern
Railroad Co. v. Hinds, supra; Smith County v. Eatherly, 820 S.W.2d 366 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991);
State ex rel. Commissioner, Department of Transportation v. Veglio, supra; Shelby County v. Stallcup,
594 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979); Memphis Housing Authority v. Newton, supra; Maryville Housing
Authority v. Ramsey, 484 S.W.2d 73 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972); Memphis Housing Authority v. Ryan, supra.

32

Memphis Housing Authority v. Peabody Garage Co., supra; Lewisburg & Northern Railroad Co. v. Hinds, supra;
Union Railway Co. v. Hunton, supra; Maryville Housing Authority v. Ramsey, supra.

33

Memphis Housing Authority v. Peabody Garage Co., supra; Lewisburg & Northern Railroad Co. v. Hinds, supra;
Croate v. Memphis Railroad Terminal Co., 120 Tenn. 525, 111 S.W. 923 (1908); Memphis Housing Authority
v. Newton, supra; Memphis Housing Authority v. Ryan, supra.

34

Croate v. Memphis Railroad Terminal Co., supra.

35

Memphis Housing Authority v. Newton, supra.

36

Memphis Housing Authority v. Ryan, supra.
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37

Layne v. Speight, supra; Memphis Housing Authority v. Newton, supra; State, Department of Highways
v. Jennings, supra.

38

Lewisburg & Northern Railroad Co. v. Hinds, supra; Union Railway Co. v. Hunton, supra; Memphis Housing
Authority v. Newton, supra; Maryville Housing Authority v. Ramsey, supra; Memphis Housing Authority v. Ryan,
supra; Edgington v. Kansas City, Memphis & Birmingham Railroad Co., supra.

39

Memphis Housing Authority v. Ryan, supra.

40

Maryville Housing Authority v. Ramsey, supra; Edgington v. Kansas City, Memphis & Birmingham Railroad Co.,
supra.

41

Lewisburg & Northern Railroad Co. v. Hinds, supra.

42

Shelby County v. Mid-South Title Co., Inc., supra.

43

Memphis Housing Authority v. Mid-South Title Co., supra.

44

Sackman and Rohan, 5 Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain, § 21.31 (Rev. 3d Ed. 1991).

45

Maryville Housing Authority v. Ramsey, supra; Memphis Housing Authority v. Ryan, supra.

46

Shelby County v. Mid-South Title Co., Inc., supra; Memphis Housing Authority v. Newton, supra.

37

Union Railway Co. v. Hunton, supra; Memphis Housing Authority v. Newton, supra.

48

State ex rel. Smith v. Livingston Limestone Co., supra; Airline Construction, Inc. v. Barr, 807 S.W.2d 247
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); Hill v. U.S. Life Title Insurance Co. of New York, 731 S.W.2d 910
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1986); State ex rel. Moulton v. Blake, 49 Tenn. App. 624, 357 S.W.2d 836 (1961).

49

Memphis Housing Authority v. Mid-South Title Co., supra.

50

Airline Construction, Inc. v. Barr, supra.

51

Smith County v. Eatherly, 820 S.W.2d 366 (Tenn. App. 1991); State v. Rascoe, supra; State ex rel. Commissioner,
Department of Transportation v. Veglio, supra; State ex rel. Moulton v. Blake, supra.

52

Love v. Smith supra; Davidson County Board of Education v. First American National Bank, supra; Alloway
v. City of Nashville, supra; Memphis Housing Authority v. Mid-South Title Co., supra.

53

State ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Brevard, supra.

54

State ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Brevard, supra.

55

State ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Brevard, supra; State ex rel. Moulton v. Blake, supra.
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56

Lewisburg & Northern Railroad Co. v. Hinds, supra; Vaulx v. Tennessee Central Railroad, supra; Wray v. Knoxville,
LaFollette & Jellico Railroad Co., 113 Tenn. 544, 82 S.W. 471 (1904); Paducah and Memphis Railroad Co.
v. Stovall, supra; Woodfolk v. Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad Co., supra; Knoxville Housing Authority, Inc.
v. Bush, 56 Tenn. App. 464, 408 S.W.2d 408 (1966).

57

Tennessee Dept. of Transportation v. Wheeler, 2002 WL 31302889 (Tenn. App. 2002); City of Memphis
v. Hood, 208 Tenn. 319, 345 S.W.2d 887 (1961); Shelby County v. Kingsway Greens of America, Inc.,
706 S.W.2d 634 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Parkes, supra.

57A

Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency v. Trinity Marine Nashville, Inc., 40 S.W.3d 73
(Tenn. App. 2000).

58

Ledbetter v. Beach, 220 Tenn. 623, 421 S.W.2d 814 (1967); State v. Rascoe, supra; Lewisburg & Northern
Railroad Co. v. Hinds, supra.

59

Ledbetter v. Beach, supra; State v. Rascoe, supra; Lewisburg & Northern Railroad Co. v. Hinds, supra.

60

Ledbetter v. Beach, supra; State v. Rascoe, supra; Lewisburg & Northern Railroad v. Hinds, supra.

60A

Town of Collierville v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 2003 WL 21026936 (Tenn. App. 2003).

61

State v. Rascoe, supra; Lewisburg & Northern Railroad Co. v. Dudley, 161 Tenn. 546, 30 S.W.2d 278 (1930);
Lewisburg & Northern Railroad Co. v. Hinds, supra.

62

State v. Rascoe, supra; Lewisburg & Northern Railroad Co. v. Dudley, supra.

63

State v. Rascoe, supra; Lewisburg & Northern Railroad Co. v. Dudley, supra; Illinois Central Railroad Co.
v. Moriarity, 135 Tenn. 446, 186 S.W. 1053 (1916); Alloway v. City of Nashville, supra.

63A
64
64A

Leonard v. Knox County, 146 S.W. 3d 589 (Tenn. App. 2004).
State ex rel. Smith v. Overstreet, 533 S.W.2d 283 (Tenn. 1976); Memphis Housing Authority v. Memphis
Steam Laundry-Cleaner, Inc., 225 Tenn. 46, 463 S.W.2d 677 (1971).
Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency v. Trinity Marine Nashville, Inc., 40 S.W.3d 73
(Tenn. App. 2000).

65

State ex rel. Commissioner of Transportation v. Edmonds, 614 S.W.2d 381 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).

66

Commissioner of Department of Transportation v. Ben Lomand Telephone Co-Op, Inc., 617 S.W.2d 146
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).

67

Lewisburg & Northern Railroad Co. v. Hinds, supra; But see Lewisburg & Northern Railroad Co. v. Dudley, supra.
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68

State ex rel. Commissioner, Department of Transportation v. Veglio, supra; Pack v. Boyer, 59 Tenn. App. 141,
438 S.W.2d 754 (1968).

69

State v. Rascoe, supra; Alloway v. City of Nashville, supra.

70

State v. Rascoe, supra.

71

State v. Rascoe, supra; Lewisburg & Northern Railroad Co. v. Hinds, supra; Vaulx v. Tennessee Central Railroad Co.,
supra; Union Railway Co. v. Raine, 114 Tenn. 569, 86 S.W. 857 (1905); Shelby County v. Kingsway Greens
of America, Inc., supra; Speight v. Lockhart, 524 S.W.2d 249 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975); Speight v. Gibbs,
486 S.W.2d 922 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972). But see Chapter Five on loss of access as a taking as opposed
to merely incidental damages.

71A

State ex rel. Commissioner of the DOT v. Goodwin, 2003 WL 21026937 (Tenn. App. 2003).

72

Wray v. Knoxville, LaFollette & Jellico Railroad Co., supra; Paducah and Memphis Railroad Co. v. Stovall, supra;
East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad Co. v. Love, 40 Tenn. 63 (1859).

73

Wray v. Knoxville, LaFollette & Jellico Railroad Co., supra; City of Memphis v. Bolton, supra.

74

Evans v. Wheeler, supra; Newberry v. Hamblen County, 157 Tenn. 491, 9 S.W.2d 700 (1928); Faulkner
v. City of Nashville, 154 Tenn. 145, 285 S.W. 39 (1926); Maryville Housing Authority v. Williams,
63 Tenn. App. 673, 478 S.W.2d 66 (1971); Department of Highways & Public Works v. Templeton,
5 Tenn. App. 485 (1927).

75

Newberry v. Hamblen County, supra; Faulkner v. City of Nashville, supra; Brookside Mills, Inc.
v. Moulton, supra; Maryville Housing Authority v. Williams, supra; Department of Highways & Public
Works v. Templeton, supra.

76

Newberry v. Hamblen County, supra; Faulkner v. City of Nashville, supra; Brookside Mills, Inc. v. Moulton, supra;
Department of Highways & Public Works v. Templeton, supra.

77

Maryville Housing Authority v. Williams, supra.

78

City of Knoxville v. Barton, 128 Tenn. 177, 159 S.W. 837 (1913); Paducah and Memphis Railroad Co.
v. Stovall, supra.

79

State v. Rascoe, supra; But see City of Parsons v. Goff, (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S. August 4, 1982);
Smith, Commissioner v. Paducah, (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S. August 20 1976).

80

State v. Rascoe, supra; City of Parsons v. Goff, supra; Smith, Commissioner v. Paducah, supra.

81

State, Department of Highways v. Urban Estates, Inc., supra; Sullivan County v. Pope, 223 Tenn. 575,
448 S.W.2d 666 (1969); Snowden v. Shelby County, 118 Tenn. 725, 102 S.W. 90 (1907); State v. Harr,
24 Tenn. App. 298, 143 S.W.2d 893 (1940).

70
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Sevier Co. v. Waters, 126 S.W. 3d 913 (Tenn. App. 2003).

CHAPTER 5
1 Johnson City v. Greeneville, 222 Tenn. 260, 435 S.W.2d 476 (1968). For application of class action provisions
to inverse condemnation actions, see Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., 924 S.W.2d 632
(Tenn. 1996).
1A

Hise v. State, 968 S.W.2d 852 (Tenn. App. 1997).

2

Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., supra; See also Johnson v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 713 S.W.2d 659
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).

3

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992);
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153 (1992).

4

Morgan County v. Neff, 36 Tenn. App. 407, 256 S.W.2d 61 (1952); Carter County v. Street,
36 Tenn. App. 166, 252 S.W.2d 803 (1952); Knox County v. Lemarr, 20 Tenn. App. 258,
97 S.W.2d 659 (1936); Shelby County v. Dodson, 13 Tenn. App. 392 (1930).

5

Pleasant View Utility District v. Vradenburg, 545 S.W.2d 733 (Tenn. 1977); Knox County v. Moncier,
224 Tenn. 361, 455 S.W.2d 153 (1970); Johnson City v. Greeneville, supra; Burchfield v. State, 774 S.W.2d 179
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); Jones v. Cocke County, supra; Osborne Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga,
561 S.W.2d 160 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).

6

Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 129 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1994); Keystone Bituminous Coal
Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 94 L.Ed.2d 472 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
supra; Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631
(1978); In Re Billing and Collection Tariffs of South Central Bell, 779 S.W.2d 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989);
Bayside Warehouse Co. v. City of Memphis, 63 Tenn. App. 268, 470 S.W.2d 375 (1971).

7

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005).

8

Pleasant View Utility District v. Vradenburg, supra; Graham v. Hamilton County, 224 Tenn. 82,
450 S.W.2d 571 (1969); Hollers v. Campbell County, 192 Tenn. 442, 241 S.W.2d 523 (1951);
Lea v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 135 Tenn. 560, 188 S.W. 215 (1915); Jones v. Cocke County,
supra; Jones v. Hamilton County, 56 Tenn. App. 240, 405 S.W.2d 775 (1965).

9

Hayes v. City of Maryville, 747 S.W.2d 346 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); Williams v. Southern Railway Co.,
57 Tenn. App. 215, 417 S.W.2d 573 (1966); Donohue v. East Tennessee Natural Gas Co., 39 Tenn. App. 438,
284 S.W.2d 692 (1955).

10

Burchfield v. State, supra.
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11

Ledbetter v. Beach, 220 Tenn. 623, 421 S.W.2d 814 (1967); Lewisburg & Northern Railroad Co. v. Hinds,
134 Tenn. 293, 183 S.W.985 (1915); Outdoor Advertising Association of Tennessee, Inc. v. Shaw,
598 S.W.2d 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

12

Ledbetter v. Beach, supra; Lewisburg & Northern Railroad Co. v. Hinds, supra; Outdoor Advertising Association of
Tennessee, Inc. v. Shaw, supra.

13

Pleasant View Utility District v. Vradenburg, supra; Knox County v. Moncier, supra; Monday v. Knox County,
220 Tenn. 313, 417 S.W.2d 536 (1967); Murphy v. Raleigh Utility District of Shelby County, 213 Tenn. 228,
373 S.W.2d 455 (1963); Hollers v. Campbell County, supra; Barron v. City of Memphis, 113 Tenn. 89,
80 S.W. 832 (1904); Burchfield v. State, supra; Jones v. Cocke County, supra; Jones v. Hamilton County, supra.

14

Evans v. Wheeler, 209 Tenn. 40, 348 S.W.2d 500 (1961).

15

Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Moriarity, 135 Tenn. 446, 186 S.W.2d 1053 (1916); Morgan County v. Neff,
supra; Knox County v. Lemarr, supra; Shelby County v. Dodson, supra.

16

Carter County v. Street, 36 Tenn. App. 166, 252 S.W.2d 803 (1952).

17

Johnson v. City of Greeneville, supra; Osborne Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, supra.

18

Cumberland Telegraph and Telephone Co. v. United Electric Railroad Co., 92 Tenn. 492, 129 S.W. 104 (1894).

19

Hydes Ferry Turnpike Co. v. Davidson County, 91 Tenn. 291 (1892).

20

Ledbetter v. Beach, supra; Outdoor Advertising Association of Tennessee, Inc. v. Shaw, supra.

20A

State ex rel. Commissioner of DOT v. Goodwin, supra.

21

See Hayes v. City of Maryville, supra.

22

Pate v. City of Martin, 614 S.W.2d 46 (Tenn. 1981); Oakely v. Simmons, 799 S.W.2d 699
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); Hayes v. City of Maryville, supra; Anthony v. Construction Products, Inc.,
677 S.W.2d 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

23

Pate v. City of Martin, supra; Hayes v. City of Maryville, supra; Anthony v. Construction Products, Inc., supra.

24

Robertson v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railroad Co., 207 Tenn. 272, 339 S.W.2d 6 (1960);
Louisville & Nashville Terminal Co. v. Lellyett, 114 Tenn. 368, 85 S.W. 881 (1898); Hayes v. City of
Maryville, supra.

25

Robertson v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railroad Co., supra; Louisville & Nashville Terminal Co. v.
Lellyett, supra.
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26
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